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CONTROL LEGISLATION
JONATHAN
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SILVERt

INTRODUCTION

T

HE PAST THREE DECADES have witnessed the emergence and
growth of a deep national concern over the destructive
environmental effects of industrial operations necessary to support
the life style to which we have become addicted.' This concern has
found expression in a body of legislation designed to control several
forms of pollution, particularly the contamination of air and water.
As may be true of most attempts to achieve societally oriented goals
through governmental regulation of the private sector, the administration of the legislative schemes has been a source of difficulty and
frustration, due to the inevitable conflict between cleaner production
methods and efficient industrial processes.
Pollution control efforts seek to reduce the quantity of pollutants
in the ambient environment to acceptable levels. Ultimately,
achievement of such levels depends upon the government's ability to
establish and enforce limits for every major producer of pollutant
emissions. Thus, the ability of administrators to translate the
criteria selected by the legislature into exact and enforceable
emission limits serves to measure the adequacy of any such scheme.
Although Congress has experimented with a variety of criteria and
enforcement mechanisms in pollution control legislation, every
major regulatory scheme has been either health- or technologybased. 2 Each type of regulation has engendered its own implementa-

t Assistant Professor of Law, Yeshiva University. B.A., Yale University, 1969;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1973.
The initial research for this article was funded by the Committee on
Environmental Decisionmaking of the National Academy of Sciences, whose
permission to publish this article is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
1. See generally International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
2. It should be noted that other pollution control programs have incorporated
both a health and technology basis. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and

Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9 (Supp. V 1975); Noise Pollution and Abatement Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1854-1858a (1970). These acts will not be treated in this article
because, in the opinion of this author, there has not been enough regulatory activity

under them upon which to evaluate their effectiveness.
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tion problems. Description of those problems and exploration of their
origins may help explain why pollution control efforts to date appear
to have been unsuccessful, and may suggest reforms which could
achieve a better environmental quality. In addition, such a
discussion may help to focus debate on the cost of environmental
quality, so that the country may decide if it is willing to pay the
necessary price.
II. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
A.

Legislation

The extent of federal participation in efforts to control air
pollution has increased steadily since the government's initial
involvement in 1955. 3 Historically, the methods used to control air
pollution from nonmobile, stationary sources were often borrowed
from a preceding water pollution control measure, with the result
that, on occasion, a particular method was first used as a water
pollution control device, and later embodied as an amendment to air
pollution control legislation. 4
The first significant federal air pollution legislation was the Air
Quality Act of 1967 (1967 Air Act).5 Congress, in the 1967 Air Act,
directed the federal government to segment the nation into
manageable air quality control regions, develop air quality criteria,
and study and recommend to the states techniques of air quality
control. 6 States were directed to file letters of intent stating that they
would formulate the desired ambient air standards and implement
the controls necessary to achieve them.7 The federal government
could establish ambient standards and concomitant controls only if
a state failed to fulfill the terms of its letter of intent. 8 In practice, the
1967 Air Act proved unsuccessful because the federal government,
due to the absence of statutory deadlines, failed to complete the
formulation of air quality criteria and control techniques. As a

3. Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). See Trumbull,
Federal Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283, 283 (1972).
The increased federal involvement has led to a certain degree of interrelation with
other pollution control efforts.
4. See Trumbull, supra note 3, at 283-84.
5. Pub. L. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (amended 1970 & 1977).
6. Id. § 107. For a description of the various air quality control provisions for
stationary sources, see generally Trumbull, supra note 3, at 286-301.
7. Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c)(1), 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
8. Id. § 108(c)(2). The Statute conditioned the authority of the federal government
to fix the standards and controls that a state must use upon a lengthy hearing and
appeal procedure, which would result in considerable delay. Id. § 108(c)(3); see
Trumbull, supra note 3, at 288.
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result, the states' obligation to file letters of intent never ripened,
and no controls were ever adopted. 9
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amendments) 10
were enacted in response to the growing public concern over public
health and the ineffectiveness of the 1967 Air Act." The 1970
Amendments altered the basic legislative scheme in two ways. First,
the legislation created step-by-step deadlines to compel both federal
and state implementation. 12 More importantly, they established a
new framework for implementation, one which gives the federal
government a larger role in the creation and enforcement of control
measures, yet continues to vest considerable responsibility in the
states.' 3
Under the current air pollution legislation, 4 the Administrator
of the federal agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),15
must perform a number of new functions in addition to many of
those imposed by the 1967 Air Act. While EPA is to continue to
designate air quality control regions and air quality criteria, 16 the
1970 Amendments also directed it to establish national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards that would embody the
acceptable minimum quality of ambient air.' 7 Primary standards are
to set the permissible level of pollutants low-enough to protect the
public health.'8 These levels are to be achieved as soon as
practicable, but in no event more than three years from the date of
enactment of the 1970 Amendments.' 9 Secondary standards are to
set levels sufficient to protect the public welfare, which includes not
only the health of persons, but also that of animals and vegetation,
9. Trumbull, supra note 3, at 288.
10. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970))
(amended 1977).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970); S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). See also Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train
v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
1593 (D. Nev. Nov. 24, 1976). The opinion in Kennecott includes a particularly useful
and succinct description of the inadequacies of the 1967 Air Act and how they led to
the 1970 Amendments. Id. at 1594-95. See generally La Pierre, Technology-Forcing
and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977).
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4, -5 (1970).
13. See id. § 1857a.
14. The current legislation is the product of the 1970 Amendments, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857-1858a (1970), and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (1977 Amendments),
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626). For purposes
of this article the current air pollution legislation will be referred to as the "Clean Air
Act."
15. For purposes of this article, references to EPA will encompass both the EPA
and the Administrator of EPA.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-2, -3 (1970).
17. Id. § 1857c-4(a).
18. Id. § 1857c-4(b)(1).
19. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 6 [1977], Art. 2

1976-1977]

AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

1125

as well as guarding against any known or anticipated adverse
effects of a pollutant. 2° Secondary standards are to be attained
21
within a reasonable time from enactment of the 1970 Amendments.
Following EPA's promulgation of ambient air standards, the
states were to submit, within a specified time, implementation

plans.2 2 Such plans had to meet specified criteria, including
23
provisions for attainment of the primary and secondary standards.
Using methods established by EPA, state agencies must measure the
24
quality of the ambient air in various locations within the region.
They are then to use an EPA approved model to devise emission

limitations and other control strategies to be imposed on all existing
stationary sources in order to achieve the national ambient air
standards. 25 The implementation plans must mandate that the

emission limitations which have been derived be applied to existing
stationary sources and must articulate other control measures as
may be necessary to meet the standard. 26 An unsatisfactory state
plan may be amended by EPA, after due notice and receipt of
27
comments from interested parties.
In devising emission limitations for existing stationary sources,
states must consider the effect that direct EPA action would have on
the amount of pollutant emissions. 28 The 1970 Amendments gave

EPA the power to formulate nationally uniform limits for emissions
from mobile sources, 29 and for pollutants designated by it as
"hazardous."30

In addition, the statute required "new stationary

sources" 31 to limit their emissions to a level calculated by the EPA
20. Id. § 1857c-4(b)(2).

21. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(ii).
22. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(1). States were required to submit plans providing for the
implementation of primary and secondary standards within nine months of the
promulgation of such standards. Id.
23. Id. State implementation plans must also, inter alia, 1) provide for the
establishment of a system to "monitor, compile, and analyze data on ambient air
quality;" 2) contain measures that are designed to facilitate "intergovernmental
cooperation;" and 3) provide "for periodic inspection and testing ...
to enforce
compliance with applicable emission standards." Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2).
24. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1976).
25. See id. § 51.12. For a cogent and succinct review of the existing stationary
source scheme, see Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act
Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 HARv. L. REV. 316, 319-29 (1975); La
Pierre, supra note 11, at 777-93.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970).
27. Id. § 1857c-5(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
28. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.14(a), (b) (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977).
30. Id. § 1857c-7 (1970) (amended 1977).
31. A "new source" is defined as "any stationary source, the construction or
modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations . .
prescribing a standard of performance [for emissions of air pollutants] which will be
applicable to such source." 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a)(2) (1970).
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which could be achieved by use of the "best demonstrated
technology.

'32

However, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977

(1977 Amendments) have supplanted this technology requirement
with a more specific one: "the best technological system of
continuous emission reduction which (taking into consideration the
cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air-quality
health and environmental impact and energy requirements) has
been adequately demonstrated . . .33
Thus, the Clean Air Act attempts to reach desirable levels of air
quality by initially determining those levels, and then using
emission reduction methods and other control techniques to achieve
them. The power to devise and apply the precise controls to
individual pollutant sources has been divided between the states and
the federal government. Although this framework may be appealing,
it is not the only method available, and, as shall be subsequently
discussed, the problems inherent in its application may make it an
impractical choice.
B. Difficulties Encountered in Application
An examination of the cases that have been litigated under the
statute provides the best illustration of the difficulties encountered in
converting the general legislative plan into regulations for individual polluters. Those cases reveal seven topics that are relevant to an
analysis of the health-based provisions of the Clean Air Act that
provide for the development and imposition of limits and controls on
individual sources.
1. Selection of Control Techniques
The ambiguous language in section 110 of the 1970 Amendments 34 created long unresolved controversy over whether the
statute established emission limitation as the preferred method of
pollution control, as a necessary component of every state plan, or as
merely one of a number of alternative controls which each state was
free to accept or reject.35 Industry generally favors the use of tall
32. Id. § 1857c-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977).

33. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7411).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) (amended 1977).
35. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B). Section 110 of the 1970 Amendments provides in
pertinent part:
The Administrator shall approve . . . [a state implementation] plan . . . if he
determines that ...
(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules and timetables for
compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be
necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or
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stacks and intermittent slowdowns or shutdowns as control
methods, because they are considerably less expensive than the
installation of emission reduction devices. The techniques industry
prefers achieve ambient air quality by dispersing the quantity of a
pollutant more uniformly over space - tall stacks - and/or time -

intermittent slowdown or shutdown - rather than by reducing the
total volume of a pollutant expelled in a given period of time emission limitation.
When a method other than emission reduction was submitted to
EPA for approval as part of a state implementation plan under
section 110, the issue of whether it was a proper control technique
occasionally arose. If EPA sanctioned an alternative method of
pollution control, environmentalists frequently contested this decision; on the other hand, if EPA disapproved the technique, industry
sought judicial review. Although EPA had on occasion sided with
industry in determining the appropriate role for emission reduction
techniques, the courts favored the position that emission limitation
was the statutorily preferred control method.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA (NRDC),36
the Fifth Circuit examined EPA's approval of Georgia's implementation plan which authorized calculation of permissible emissions
according to the dispersion effect of stack height. 37 The court
identified two possible interpretations of section 110, a broad one
that would require the use of emission limitation methods to the
maximum extent feasible, and a narrow one that would mandate
approval of any plan that cqmplied with national standards,
regardless of the control methods used. 38 Examination of the statute
and its history led the court to conclude that the former approach
was correct. 39 EPA then argued, however, that a state plan was
consistent with the broad approach as long as an emission
limitation existed for every emission source, even if the plan attained
national standards with the help of dispersion techniques. 4° The
court rejected this position, ruling that emission limitation must be
used to the fullest extent possible. 41 The court noted that dispersion
secondary standard, including, but not limited to land-use and transportation controls.

Id. (emphasis added).
36. 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
37. 489 F.2d at 393, 403.
38. Id. at 406. The court did not engage in a discussion concerning an
intermediate position, such as a requirement that a state plan or individual source
must make some use of emission limitation.
39. Id. at 406-07.
40. Id. at 410.
41. Id. at 407-08.
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techniques could supplement emission controls only if the maximum

feasible use of the latter was insufficient to attain national
42
standards.
The industry approach - tall stacks and intermittent slow-orshutdowns - which met with judicial disfavor, would have achieved
national ambient air standards, while minimizing the cost of
pollution control and the resulting economic dislocations. Therefore,
state officials, when faced with the conflict between protecting the
economic health of their state or its environment, may have been
tempted to condone methods of pollution control other than emission
limitation. In order to justify the use of dispersion methods, state
plans may, however, have exaggerated the ambient air quality
attainable through the use of dispersion techniques. 43 Furthermore,
dispersion necessarily degrades the quality of air elsewhere that is
cleaner than required by national standards. 44 Although EPA
45
regulations allowing degradation of the quality of adjacent air
were upheld, 46 the result may be undesirable. In addition, one may
question the extent to which Congress intended a statute based upon
considerations of public health and welfare to be applied on the
basis of economic consequences. Given that the standards would
have been met in any event, and that emission reduction would not
have been demanded beyond the bounds of economic feasibility, to
allow economic desirability to produce a result which permitted
pollution of air that was cleaner than that mandated by national
standards was inimical to the statute's health and welfare bases. On
the other hand, the interpretation of section 110 which was accepted
by such cases as NRDC would have necessitated significant
expenditures to achieve an ambient air quality that may have been
superior to that required by the national standards. It is not clear
that this was a prudent allocation of resources, particularly when

42. See id. at 410. See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 10
(6th Cir. 1975). Since both of these cases involved industry challenges to EPA actions,
EPA has apparently abandoned the statutory construction it advocated in the Fifth
Circuit - that emission limitation methods need not be employed to the maximum
extent feasible. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
43. Resolution of the question of how much reduction is needed or feasible can be
troublesome. See notes 54-122 and accompanying text infra.
44. For a discussion of the conflict between further degradation of the quality of
adjacent air and the purpose of the 1970 Amendments, see notes 153-171 and
accompanying text infra.
45. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 42,514 (1974).
46. Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959
(1977). Compare Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), with Sierra Club
v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). aff'd per curiam, No. 72-1528 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 1, 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra
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the economy was not altogether healthy; nor was it certain that
Congress had made such a choice.
The difficulty of weighing the economic considerations of
pollution control was an inevitable consequence of a health-based
regulatory scheme which produced a severe financial impact on
industry, but ignored the economic impact of the regulation.
Industry will pursue courses available to avoid expenditures, and
arguments that draw their unspoken but obvious premise from
adverse economic effects are persuasive.47 It may be that, in 1970,
the members of Congress could not agree on this issue and,
therefore, left it for the courts to resolve. Although this may be one
way to reach a decision - assuming that Congress is willing to
48
amend the legislation, if necessary, after judicial construction the excessive and prolonged litigation and the accompanying delay
impeded industry's adjustment to the financial burden created by
the congressional decisions to improve environmental quality, and
undoubtedly retarded realization of clean air goals. Congress
appears to have provided an answer to the problem in section 121 of
the 1977 Amendments. 49 That section of the new legislation
explicitly provides that tall stacks and other dispersion techniques
may not affect the degree of emission limitation required for control
of any air pollutant.5° The Conference Report on the 1977 Amendments 51 states that "dispersion technology is not an acceptable
means of meeting State Implementation Plan emission limitations. ' 52 However, the prohibition of the use of dispersion techniques
to meet state emission requirements does not apply to those
techniques that were employed prior to the date of the 1970
Amendments.5 3 The 1977 Amendments are a commendable step in
the right direction, but one which ought not to have awaited seven
years of confused litigation for clarification.

Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), and NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 408 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
47. Indeed, it is interesting to note that EPA's position in NRDC seems to have
been an attempt to minimize the state's economic dislocation. See text accompanying
note 40 supra.
48. In the 1977 Amendments, Congress explicitly adopted the judicially developed
construction that dispersion techniques could not be used to reduce the amount of
emission limitation necessary for compliance with the Clean Air Act. See text
accompanying notes 49-53 infra. For a detailed narration of the legislative history of
this issue from 1970 to 1975, see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149,
1156-60 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
49. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 121, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7423).
50. Id.
51. H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
52. Id. at 144.
53. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 121, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7423).
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2. Development of Models for the Derivation of Emission Limitations from Ambient Levels
EPA has developed models for states to follow in establishing

specific emission limits once the national air quality standards have
been set. 54 Thus, the structure of the model plays a significant role in
determining the specific emission levels that will ultimately be
tolerated from individual pollution sources. For this reason, both

industry and the states have challenged the reasonableness of EPA
models in court. Although the challenges have not been entirely
successful,5 5 these cases illustrate the factors that may form the
basis of an attack.
In South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 56 petitioners challenged EPA's
57
transportation control plan for the Boston Metropolitan Area.
Among other grounds, 58 petitioners alleged that EPA's model had
failed to consider local topography and meteorology, 59 had supplied
an inaccurate relationship of secondary air pollutants to primary
pollutants, 60 and had erroneously imposed the controls over a large
region rather than only in heavily polluted localities. 61 Although the

court sustained EPA's model, the case illustrates the types of
contentions that can be raised. 62 Given the complexity of factors that

EPA must consider when developing these models for states to use
as guidelines in establishing emission limits, 63 challenges to such
models will inhibit effective implementation of the Clean Air Act by
promising delay and, perhaps, some victories for industry and
recalcitrant states.

Similarly, in Texas v. EPA,6 4 the state challenged EPA's
revision of the state's implementation plan. 65 Determining that
Texas' plan was not stringent enough to achieve the required

54. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.41-.63 (1976). See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 56-62 & 64-70 infra.
56. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
57. Massachusetts failed to submit an implementation plan for EPA approval;
therefore, EPA formulated a plan for the state pursuant to section 110(c) of the 1970
Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See 504 F.2d at 654.
58. For a list of the other objections that were raised, see note 62 infra.
59. Id. at 662.
60. Id. In South Terminal the allegedly inaccurate relationship was between
"photochemical oxidants," which are secondary pollutants "derived from the reaction
of two primary pollutants, hydrocarbons and nitrogen," and hydrocarbons. Id. See
note 67 infra.
61. 504 F.2d at 662-63.
62. Id. at 656-61 (procedural objections); id. at 662-67 (contention that emission
reduction not needed); id. at 667-71 (assertion of lack of EPA authority); id. at 671-76
(argument that controls were arbitrary and capricious); id. at 676-80 (constitutional
objections).
63. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
64. 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974).
65. 499 F.2d at 294.
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ambient air quality 66 and rejecting the model Texas had- used to
derive the pollution controls set forth in the plan, 67 EPA revised the
plan to align it with the results obtained through the use of a
substitute model. 68 The Fifth Circuit upheld EPA's rejection of the
model Texas had employed, finding it to be "unsupported by data,

theory, or even meaningful

explanations."6 9 Although EPA's

substitute model also lacked an empirical base, the court held that

EPA's amendment

of the Texas plan was not arbitrary or

70

capricious.
Once again, then, EPA received a flexible and
understanding judicial response; and the court's emphasis on the
narrow scope of review suggests that EPA may continue to meet

with success on the issue of whether its models for'the formulation of
state implementation plans are proper. 71 However, EPA has had and
may continue to have substantial difficulty in court on the equally

7 2
significant and corollary issue of measurement accuracy.
The Second Circuit case of National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA (NRDC v. EPA)73 arose from another problem posed by

the conversion of national ambient air standards into specific
emission limits. The petitioners challenged EPA's approval of New
York's implementation plan on the ground that its emissions limits
were inadequate to achieve the necessary ambient air quality. 74 New
66. Id. at 293.
67. Id. at 295. The type of model at issue was a reduction model. Id.
Photochemical oxidant pollutants, or smog, can be controlled by limiting the
emissions of hydrocarbons which typically occur "during the production, storage,
transportation and use of a variety of petroleum products." Id. at 293 n.1. In
determining the amount of reduction of hydrocarbon emissions necessary to maintain
photochemical oxidant pollutants at the required level, reduction models are used to
display the relationship between the hydrocarbon emissions and the resultant
pollutants. The results derived from these models are then translated into the specific
emission limitations contained in state implementation plans. Id. at 294-95.
68. Id. at 295.
69. Id. at 301. /
70. Id. The court's view of the appropriate level of review was as follows:
"Necessity, which has mothered the EPA's invention of this model, also protects it
from a judicial insistence on greater reliability." Id. The court's utilization of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review was based upon section 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), which provides for judicial review
of federal agency action in the absence of a specific statutory provision. 499 F.2d at
296-97.
It should be noted that although the court upheld EPA's use of a substitute
model, certain regulations applicable to Texas' implementation plan were declared
invalid. Id. at 310-18.
71. Judicial support for an EPA model does not guarantee, however, that it will be
sufficiently stringent to achieve the national ambient air standards. It is possible that
even EPA's model may sanction too much hydrocarbon emission, as the Fifth Circuit
may have implied when it noted that EPA's substituted model was "neutral." See 499
F.2d at 301.
72. See text accompanying notes 79-122 infra.
73. 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974).
74. Id. at 522.
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York maintained that any inability to achieve the national
standards was caused by prevailing winds from New Jersey which
brought large quantities of the pollutant at issue - sulfur dioxide into New York.7 5 EPA defended its approval of New York's plan by
claiming that the conversion from coal to oil as the energy source for
power plants would alleviate the problem.7 6 Finding that there was
little likelihood of conversion to oil at a time when oil supplies were
scarce, the court remanded the plan to EPA for further consideration. 77 NRDC v. EPA is nonetheless interesting because the
problems of setting and implementing emission limitations encountered in the case appear to have resulted from the artificial
geographic boundaries of the air quality control regions involved.
New York and nearby New Jersey are really one vast industrial
sprawl, which the wind helps to unify for air quality purposes.
Perhaps EPA should be given the power to exercise broader
78
authority over such interstate metropolitan complexes.
3. Test Procedures and Accuracy of Measurements
Before and after emission reduction models are applied, the
amount of pollutant in the ambient air must be measured. Such
measurement is essential for proper application of the model and for
enforcement of the limitations set for individual polluters. Thus,
even if a court approves EPA's model, there may be a further facet to
an industry's challenge to a pollution control plan. Measurement of
pollutant levels is a complex process, 79 and industry challenges to
measurement have met with considerable success.
In South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,80 the regulatees challenged
three key measurements EPA had relied upon to formulate a
transportation control plan for Boston: 1) the hydrocarbon level in
the Boston region; 8' 2) the carbon monoxide level in the Boston core
75. Id. at 525. The flow of New Jersey's sulfur dioxide emissions into New York
reduced the quality of New York's air because New Jersey's limits for the pollutant
were higher (.2% to .3% of ambient air) than New York's controls (.1%). Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 526.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(c) (1970). Section 107(c) of the 1970 Amendments does
authorize EPA to designate interstate areas as air quality control regions. Id.
§ 1857c-2(c). However, EPA may only promulgate its own implementation plan for a
region after a state plan has been determined to be unsatisfactory. Id. § 1857c-5(c)
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
79. See Bleicher, supra note 25, at 325.
80. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). For a prior discussion of South Terminal, see
notes 56-62 and accompanying text supra.
81. 504 F.2d at 662. The level of hydrocarbons is related to the amount of
photochemical oxidant pollutants - smog - in the air. See note 67 supra. Therefore,
both the amount of photochemical oxidants and hydrocarbons must be measured in
order to calculate emission limits. 504 F.2d at 662.
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area; and 3) the carbon monoxide level at Logan Airport.82 After a
review of the measurement and calculation methods and the alleged
inadequacies of those methods, the First Circuit sustained all three
8 3

challenges.

The hydrocarbon measurement was the result of one day's
testing, during which the monitoring device recorded a number of
different readings, suggesting that the equipment may have been
defective.8 4 The court was unwilling to affirm the accuracy of such
unnecessarily suspicious key data, even though EPA argued that
85
those readings could have resulted from other, innocent factors.
The court also sustained dual challenges to EPA's carbon
monoxide data. EPA had based the calculations on a one-day
reading in Kenmore Square taken in 1970, which was nearly twice as
high as the next highest reading at that location. 86 Although even
higher readings were recorded in other locations in different years,
the court, relying on an EPA policy that other locations should serve
as controls when there are significantly varying readings in one
location, held that there was an insufficient basis upon which to
87
affirm EPA's calculations.
EPA had also sought to impose controls to reduce private
88
automobile use to and from Logan Airport (Logan) in East Boston.
These controls were ostensibly necessary to enable that area to meet
national primary air standards. Because the evidence was meager
and conflicting, the court ruled that it was not yet clear whether the
air at Logan itself would meet national standards without the
controls sought by EPA.8

9

Based on EPA's projection that Logan

traffic would affect the carbon monoxide level in the East Boston
area, 9 EPA further argued that controls at Logan were required in
any event if the rest of East Boston was to comply with the
standards. EPA had not, however, even measured the carbon
monoxide problem in East Boston, but had merely relied upon
figures and formulae for the Boston core. 91 Since a carbon monoxide
82. 504 F.2d at 662.
83. Id. at 666.
84. Id. at 662.
85. Id. EPA maintained that the irregular readings could have been caused by
"instrument calibration, instrument zeroing, transmissions loss and depletion of span
gas, all of which causes are unrelated to any malfunction." Id.
86. Id. at 663.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 655, 664.
89. Id. at 664.
90. Id. at 663-64. EPA had concluded that the carbon monoxide problem in the
East Boston area was due to the concentration of traffic around Logan. Id., citing 38
Fed. Reg. 20, 961 (1973).
91. Id. at 664-65.
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pollutant tends to remain near the source of its emission, and
because the traffic patterns at Logan are more concentrated than
those of the core city, the court held that the record did not support
92
EPA's conclusions.
Absent a thorough study of the record, it is difficult to judge
whether the First Circuit ruled properly in South Terminal. It may
well be that it is difficult to create a convincing record on issues of
measurement. The opinion, however, provokes the more fundamental question of whether, regardless of the language used, the court
applied a stricter standard of review than is customary.9 3 Such a
standard could have resulted from the unstated but self-evident fact
that EPA's proposal was not one that would merely escalate the cost
of doing business, but was one that "has been recognized from the
outset to present delicate problems; inevitably it seems bound to
come between the citizen and his automobile." 94 Such an articulation
in judicial opinions of the tremendous conflict generated by air
pollution from automobile use, 95 coupled with many cities' failure to
provide adequate mass transit or to encourage people to use
available mass transit services, suggest that the success of the
nation's attempt to clean the air may depend on serious legislative
reflection concerning more effective authority and strategies to
reduce the use of the automobile or, alternatively, to impose stricter,
and hence more expensive, controls on stationary sources.
Although the issue raised in Texas v. EPA,96 was not strictly one
of measurement, the case did present the related issue of the amount
of reduction particular controls could be expected to achieve.9 7 Texas
challenged EPA's amended plan for the state on the ground that the
EPA calculations of reactive hydrocarbon emissions9 8 for the
chemical processing and petroleum refining industries were too
92. Id. The court noted that airport traffic was confined to major arteries while
center city traffic was more diffused; and, therefore, the patterns of carbon monoxide
pollution resulting from vehicle exhaust systems would be different in the two areas.
Id.
93. Cf. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974)
(abuse of discretion standard); see notes 64-71 and accompanying text supra.
94. 504 F.2d at 654.
95. The extent of the conflict that transportation controls generate has been noted
in other cases. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 622
(D.C. Cir. 1973). As the court in InternationalHarvesterpointed out, the conflict is due
not only to Americans' romance with the automobile; but also to the potentially
castastrophic economic impact reduced automobile use could precipitate. Id. at 641.
96. 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied; 419 U.S. 840 (1974). For the previous
discussion of this case, see notes 64-71 and accompanying text supra.
97. 499 F.2d at 301-02; see Bleicher, supra note 25, at 325-26.
98. The term reactive hydrocarbon emissions was defined by the court as
"hydrocarbon emissions which react with nitrogen oxides to form oxidant pollutants." 499 F.2d at 298. See note 67 supra.
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low.99 To calculate the amount of reactive hydrocarbon in a given
volume of hydrocarbon, it is necessary to apply to the total volume a
fraction - the reactivity factor - that represents the relationship of
reactive hydrocarbon to total hydrocarbon for a particular industry's
types of emissions. 10° For both industries EPA had derived the
challenged reactivity factors from empirical studies of similar
industries in Los Angeles, California and Louisiana. 1° 1 With respect
to the chemical processing industry, the court sustained EPA's
reactivity factor, finding that EPA had given Texas the benefit of
the doubt by applying a factor higher than the highest fraction
supported by the studies. 102
' For petroleum refining, however, EPA
used the lower of the factors from the studies without explaining
why it chose the lower factor, thereby giving Texas no benefit of the
doubt.10 3 Therefore, the court ordered EPA to grant extensions to the
petroleum refining industry for the implementation of some of the
10 4
regulations that were sustained.
Texas v. EPA is a complex and cumbersome case. While some of
EPA's actions were upheld, others were remanded. Further, the court
ordered a delay in implementing portions of those that were
sustained. From a reading of the case, it is difficult to determine
whether the result was a victory or defeat for EPA, but from this
perspective it appears to have been the latter. It is impossible,
however, to level informed criticism at the court. The stakes were
very high - quick and effective pollution control requiring an
enormous capital investment likely to have an adverse impact upon
the state's economy. It may be that under these circumstances
judges unconsciously will insist that they be more fully convinced of
the need for such an undertaking before deferring to EPA's
determinations than in an ordinary review of an agency's actions.
Tying emission restrictions, and hence the required capital investment, to a health, or any other ambient air or water quality
standard, without also incorporating technological and economic
considerations, seems to increase the judicial temptation to remain

99. 499 F.2d at 304-18. The result of the lower figure, which Texas wished to
avoid, would be a requirement of greater controls for other sources of hydrocarbon
emissions, specifically transportation, as in South Terminal. See notes 56-62, 88-94
and accompanying text supra.
100. 499 F.2d at 304.
101. Id. at 305, 308.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 308. EPA also failed to respond to the challenge that the use of the Los
Angeles study for the derivation of the reactivity factor to be applied to the petroleum
refining industry was invalid because that study was outdated - being based on
1955-58 data. Id.
104. Id. at 308.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss6/2

14

Silver: Problems in Attempting to Translate Statuory Standards into Emiss

1136

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

22: p. 1122

unpersuaded that EPA's promulgations have been sufficiently
considered.
Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus105 presented
testing and measurement issues in yet another form. Here, industry
challenged EPA's promulgated standards for new and modified
stationary sources on a variety of grounds. 06 One aspect of the
challenge which the District of Columbia Circuit Court accepted was
that EPA's reliance upon a single test from one plant was improper
because it formed an insufficient basis for concluding that all new
plants could meet the standard thus derived. 10 7 In addition, the court
criticized EPA's apparent use of the same test to derive a standard
for plants which used a different process. 0 8 Since EPA had not
complied with its own regulations with respect to the duration of the
testing and the level of operation during testing, 10 9 the court upheld
the petitioners' attack on EPA's sampling techniques. 1 0 Petitioners
also challenged the enforceability of EPA's opacity test, a regulation
that defined opacity"' and established a standard which no smoke
stack plume was to exceed." 2 They relied upon an HEW experiment
to argue that the test was unenforceable because opacity could not be
objectively measured." 3 Although the court did not rule the test
arbitrary, it found the test's reasonableness unproven and required
EPA to submit a more extensive record on remand." 1 4 Apparently,
the court did not specifically sustain or deny several other
contentions, but indicated that EPA should address them on
5
remand."l
The District of Columbia Circuit was not satisfied with the EPA
actions it reviewed. Although the court did not specifically say so, it
seems to have thought that EPA's decisionmaking process was
105. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

106. It will be recalled that the statutory standard for new sources was "the best
demonstrated technology." See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970) (amended 1977). See also
notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
107. 486 F.2d at 396.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 396-97 & n.79, citing 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876 (1971).
110. 486 F.2d at 396-99.
111. Id. at 401. The court took its definition of opacity from an EPA regulation,
noting that "[o]pacity is defined by the regulation as 'the degree to which emissions
reduce the transmission of light and obscure the view of an object in the
background.'" Id. at 400, quoting 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876 (1971).
112. 486 F.2d at 401, citing 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876 (1971). The regulation established
that the required opacity level had to be "[g]reater than 10 percent opacity, except that
where the presence of uncombined water is the only reason for failure to meet the
requirements .
such failure shall not be a violation of this section." 36 Fed. Reg.
24,876 (1971).
113. 486 F.2d at 401.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 399-400.
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hasty, haphazard, sloppy, and simply not supported by an amount
of evidence commensurate with the gravity of the regulating
contemplated. 16 In this case, however, it is not possible to blame the
health standard, because regulations for new sources of emissions
are subject to a technology standard. 1 7 Nor is it possible to blame
the American desire to drive unfettered, for only stationary sources
were involved. It is possible that this court, perhaps like the First
and Fifth Circuits,"' was not fully convinced that EPA had derived
its standards carefully enough to warrant the economic consequences that would follow enforcement.
It cannot be denied that the field of emission control is terribly
complex and the development of standards difficult." 9 That is why
judges have been uniformly able to hold that regulations were
insufficiently explained or supported. Although EPA's position can
be understood, it is difficult to fault judges for pointing out that the
emperor has no clothes. One solution to this difficulty may be simply
for EPA to take more care and time in devising and promulgating
standards; 20 but it may also be preferable to devise a system of
pollution control that does not depend on such vulnerable measurement requirements. 21 Although it is still unclear whether the courts
will allow EPA sufficient discretion with regard to the issues of
appropriate testing and measuring procedures, which are at the core
of the conflict between the environment and the economy, so far
22
EPA has experienced difficulty in producing acceptable records.
4.

Relevance of technological and economic feasibility

The regulations governing existing stationary source emissions
were the battleground for resolution of the question of whether
Congress intended technological or economic infeasibility or
116. See id. at 402.
117. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 80-94, 96-104 supra.
119. See Bleicher, supra note 25, at 325.
120. For example, on appeal following remand of PortlandCement, the District of

Columbia Circuit affirmed EPA's actions on the remand. Portland Cement v.
Ruckelshaus, 513 F.2d 506, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

121. For an opposing attitude concerning measurement requirements, see Air
Pollution Variance Bd, v. Western Alfalfa, 9 ERC 1236, 1239 (Colo. 1976). In Western
Alfalfa, the Colorado state court sustained the state board's measurements without
detailed discussion. Id. at 1238-39. Although this case, which is more recent than the
others, may indicate a shift in judicial attitudes, it is also possible that state courts
are less reluctant to enforce strictures that harm the state's economy than the federal
courts have been, since the state courts are not subject to criticism for federal
intervention. Colorado's reputation as a state very much concerned with protecting its
environmental quality may also provide a limited explanation for the court's holding.
122. For an excellent, detailed consideration of this problem, see Bleicher, supra
note 25, at 325-27, 329-51.
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impossibility to be relevant considerations in formulating emission
limitations.' 2 Industry has asserted that compliance with the
requirements of some state implementation plans is too expensive to
make further plant operations feasible. The National Resources
Defense Council and others who seek vigorous enforcement of
environmental protection legislation contend that Congress expected
some plants to shut down if they could not operate within the
required emission limitations.
The lower courts' responses to the feasibility issue had conflicted
but the Supreme Court has recently resolved the issue. The Third,
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits had sustained industry
challenges to EPA's approval of state plans. In Buckeye Power, Inc.
v. EPA, 124 the petitioners sought review of a state plan which EPA
had approved without allowing public comment. 125 The petitioners
alleged that their inability to satisfy the requirements of the plan
should have been taken into consideration in EPA's decision to
approve the plan. 126 In a brief discussion, the Sixth Circuit rejected
27
EPA's position that impossibility of compliance was irrelevant.1
The court asserted that the legislative history on which EPA relied
was too meager to support an interpretation that would threaten the
continued operation of power plants across the country.1 28 In
addition, the court presented other legislative history to contradict
EPA's argument. 29 Although the court purportedly rested its
decision upon its version of the legislative history, its curt dismissal
of EPA's position makes it likely that the court simply would not
recognize a congressional intent with such far-reaching consequences without the support of an explicit statutory provision. 130
123. There can be no debate on this issue with regard to limits for new sources of
emissions since the statute explicitly mandates that the standards for new sources are
to be tied to considerations of infeasibility. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a)(1) (1970); Pub. L.
No. 95-95, § 109, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7411). See also text
accompanying note 33 supra.
124. 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
125. Id. at 165.

126. Id.
127. Id. at 168-69.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 168. The court noted that Congress had passed the House, rather than
the Senate version of the 1970 Amendments and therefore concluded that language in
the Senate Report to the effect that polluters unable to comply with the standards
might be required to terminate operations was not determinative of legislative intent.
Id., citing S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970). However, the House
Report, which the court pointed out as indicating a contrary intent, dealt with
sections of the bill that were deleted from the 1970 Amendments as finally enacted.
See H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Therefore, it could be argued that
the court incorrectly relied upon this substituted legislative history. See Bleicher,
supra note 25, at 337-40.
130. See 481 F.2d at 168-69.
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With a similar lack of support and perceptive discussion, the
Third Circuit held, in St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA,' 3 1 that
Congress had vested in EPA authority to disapprove any state plan
found to be technologically infeasible. 132 Three years earlier, the
Third Circuit had rejected EPA's initial approval of Pennsylvania's
plan because EPA had not afforded St. Joe a hearing on feasibility,
and had remanded the plan to EPA to conduct such a hearing. 133 At
the conclusion of the hearing that was held on remand, EPA
determined that certain provisions of the plan were technologically
infeasible as applied to St. Joe, 3 4 but nevertheless refused to
disapprove the plan, claiming that the 1970 Amendments did not
authorize disapproval on that basis.' 35 In holding that such
authority did exist under the 1970 Amendments, the Third Circuit
asserted that its present decision was implicit in its previous remand
of the case. 136 As seemed to be true for the Sixth Circuit in Buckeye
Power, however, the Third Circuit's underlying rationale appeared to
be an unwillingness to endorse a state plan that would force

shutdown without the existence of statutory language stating that
137
Congress intended to produce such a result.
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit in Union Electric Co. v.

EPA,' 3s expressly held that EPA must approve an otherwise proper
plan regardless of its technological and economic feasibility, 139 and

131. 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 425 U.S. 987 (1976).
132. 508 F.2d at 748-49.
133. See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1973). In holding that
the failure to provide St. Joe with a hearing was "fundamentally unfair", the court
appeared to agree with St. Joe's contention that this failure constituted a denial of due
process. Id. at 5 & 100.
134. See 508 F.2d at 745. St. Joe operated a zinc-smelting plant which emitted
sulfur oxides. Id. at 744. The sulfur oxide controls included in the state's plan were far
more stringent than the emission standard required by EPA for zinc smelters. Id.,
citing 40 C.F.R. §51 (1975).
135. See 508 F.2d at 745. EPA did propose, however, that Pennsylvania revise its
plan and that enforcement against St. Joe be stayed. Id. at 745.
136. Id. at 747-48.
137. See id. at 748. In St. Joe, unlike Buckeye Power, the challenged limitation was
apparently unnecessary to meet national standards. See id. at 745. Under the 1970
Amendments, however, states are free to adopt more restrictive standards than are
essential for compliance with the national standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (Supp. V
1975). A Seventh Circuit case, Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.
1975), held that although one source's inability to comply with stricter controls would
not defeat a plan, such inability could be raised as a defense in an individual
enforcement action. Id. at 845. The Fourth Circuit aligned itself with the Third, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits on the issue of the authority of EPA to disapprove a state plan
on the basis of infeasibility in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.
1973).
138. 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
139. 515 F.2d at 215; see text accompanying notes 147-49 infra.
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other circuits have intimated their apparent agreement. 140 The
Eighth Circuit pointed out that the Senate version of the 1970
Amendments had prevailed in Conference, 4 1 and therefore relied
upon the statement in the Senate Report that "existing sources of
pollution either should meet the standard of the law or be closed
down."' 1 42 The court additionally noted that the mandatory language

of section 110(a)(2), 143 which imposed a duty upon EPA to approve a
state plan, did not condition approval on technological or economic
1 44
feasibility.
Although the Eighth Circuit was not insensitive to the effect
that a shutdown would have on the economy, it was convinced that
Congress had made a judgment which courts should respect.
Therefore, the court concluded that if economic and technological
considerations were to be evaluated in the approval of a plan,
Congress would have to amend the statute.1 45 Although this reading
of the 1970 Amendments seemed to be most consonant with
congressional

will,146

several

courts rejected

it

thus

causing

considerable difficulty and delay in the enforcement of the 1970
Amendments.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Eighth Circuit to
resolve the conflict and uncertainty among the circuits. In Union
Electric Co. v. EPA,147 the Court reviewed the legislative history of
the statute and unanimously concluded that Congress intended EPA
to ignore considerations of technological and economic infeasibility
when deciding to approve or reject a proposed state plan.14 8 Two
concurring justices, although agreeing that the general legislative
intention was clear, questioned whether Congress really wanted to
140. See NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 1974); South Terminal Corp. v.
EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 314 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 527 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
Bleicher, supra note 25, at 317 & n.7, 341 & nn.141-43.
141. 515 F.2d at 215. It should be noted that the House bill number was retained
even though the text of the Senate bill prevailed. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); see 515 F.2d at 215.
142. 515 F.2d at 215, quoting S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970). This
report appears to supply the clear congressional intent that the circuit courts of
appeals in Buckeye Power and St. Joe demanded. See text accompanying notes 130 &
137 supra.
The Eighth Circuit in Union Electric also quoted from Senator Muskie's
equally explicit floor comments. 515 F.2d at 215, quoting 116 CONG. REC. 16091-96
(1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). The court further observed that the Senate bill had in
fact prevailed in conference although the House bill number was retained. 515 F.2d at
215. See note 129 supra.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
144. 515 F.2d at 215-16.
145. Id. at 219.
146. Accord, Bleicher, supra note 25, at 322-25.
147. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
148, Id. at 257.
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force the Union Electric Company, which supplied electricity to a
large portion of Missouri and neighboring states, to discontinue
operations if it were unable to fulfill the requirements of the state
14 9
plan.
The difficulty that the economic and technological feasibility
issue has created in enforcing the 1970 Amendments is instructive
and suggestive. Although the opinions of both the Eighth Circuit
and the Supreme Court leave no doubt regarding the intention of
Congress to preclude consideration of feasibility factors as they
relate to health-based standards, a significant number of judges who
15°
faced the issue had been unwilling to take such a forceful position.
This reluctance may be due to pressures asserted by economic
interest groups on the interpretation and implementation of
legislation when their lobbyists have been unsuccessful in persuading Congress prior to the enactment of a statute. If the impact of
economic considerations will be reflected in administrative and
judicial decisions, it might be prudent to inject such considerations
directly and narrowly into the deliberated statutory scheme.
Moreover, even though the result that Congress apparently intended
was finally reached within the judicial process, a great deal of
litigation and delay preceded its achievement. And, indeed, as the
concurring justices implied,1 5 1 the desirability of shutting down large
industrial segments, if unable to comply, is dubious. Although the
Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court upheld EPA's position, both
questioned the legislative judgment.152 The strictly health-based
standards at issue in these cases may be admirable; but they may
also be an impracticable and ultimately undesirable method of
attaining a better environment.
5.

Nondegradation of Existing High-Quality Air

Before the passage of the 1977 Amendments, a controversy had
arisen over whether the nondegradation requirements of the 1970
Amendments prohibited further pollution of a region which had an
air quality superior to that mandated by the primary and secondary
air quality standards. This dispute emerged because the clean air
legislation is founded upon ambient air quality, and provides for the

149. Id. at 270-72 (Powell, J. & Burger, C.J., concurring). In the 1977 Amendments,
Congress does not appear to have addressed this issue, except with respect to new
sources. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411). See also text accompanying note 33 supra.
150. See notes 124-37 and accompanying text supra.
151. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
152. See 427 U.S. at 270-72 (Powell, J. & Burger, C.J., concurring); 515 F.2d at 219.
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development of emission limitations based upon the achievement of
desired air quality levels.
In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,15 3 the Sierra Club challenged an
EPA regulation that sipulated that a state plan would meet the
statutory criteria, even if it sanctioned the deterioration of the
ambient air quality to the level specified in national secondary
standards. 5 4 The District Court for the District of Columbia, the
only court whose opinion was reported in this case, 55 relied upon
language in the 1970 Amendments that stated that the purpose of
the statute was to preserve and enhance the quality of air and upon
an explicit statement in the Senate Committee Report that state
plans would be required, to the maximum extent practicable, to
maintain a quality of air superior to the minimum level.156 The court
decided that nondeterioration was an important goal of the statute,
57
and held the regulation invalid.
After some delay, EPA promulgated new regulations to reflect
this nondeterioration mandate, 58 but the issue remained sufficiently
important to receive legislative attention. The 1977 Amendments
attempt to resolve the nondeterioration issue. Section 127 of the
statute15 9 adds ten new provisions to the Clean Air Act.16° Although
the legislation is still young, some observations may be made with
respect to it. In general, the new provisions seem designed to check
deterioration more effectively than the EPA regulations.' 6 ' In
153. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam, No. 72-1528 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1,
1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412
U.S. 541 (1973).
154. 344 F. Supp. at 254.
155. The opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the
district court's judgment was not reported. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1528
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1972) (per curiam). The case was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court by an equally divided court without opinion. Fri v, Sierra Club, 412
U.S. 541 (1973) (per curiam).
156. 344 F. Supp. at 255, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970), and S. REP. No. 1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
157. 344 F. Supp. at 255-56.
158. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1976); see Note, Review of EPA's Significant Deterioration
Regulations: An Example of the Difficulties of the Agency - Court Partnership in
Environmental Law, 61 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1975). The validity of the regulations was
sustained in Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct,
1610 (1977).
159. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7470).
160. See id.
161. The regulations, for example, divided areas into three classes, and emissions
permissible in Class I areas were significantly lower than those allowed in Class II
areas. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(2)(i) (1976). Similarly, Class III areas were limited only by
the national ambient air quality standards. Id. § 52.21(c)(2)(ii). The regulations placed
all areas into Class II initially and then allowed for redesignation. Id. § 52.21(c)(3)(i).
The 1977 Amendments, on the other hand, add a new section to the Clean Air Act
which places some specified types of land in Class I and precludes redesignation of
those areas. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127 (a), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (adding, inter alia, § 162(a)
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addition to codifying the regulations with respect to new sources, 162
the new sections supplement the list of pollutants for which emission
163
control regulations must be established to prevent deterioration.
However, the statute now provides EPA with the authority to grant
variances for the construction of new sources in federally managed
Class 1164 regions.' 65 The new provisions also preclude judicial
review of the grant of such a variance if the President decides that a
1 66
variance for the proposed facility is "in the national interest."
This lack of opportunity for judicial review seems inimical to
attempts to preserve existing high-quality air. However, evaluation
of the full effect of these new sections must await instances of their
application.
Before the enactment of the 1977 Amendments, deterioration
was inadvertently allowed in another context. The dispersion
technique cases' 67 have generally condoned the use of tall stacks, a
control method that spreads the pollutant over a larger area. It
seems that this technique could succeed only if the outlying areas
receiving the pollutant are already in compliance with national
standards. However, tall stacks undoubtedly will deteriorate the air
quality in those areas. It may be that the limitations expressed in
the Senate Committee Report on the 1970 Amendments - nondeterioration to the maximum extent practicable68 - operated in the tall
stack cases, since tall stacks were permitted only after the maximum
169
feasible use has been made of emission reduction systems.
However, since these cases did not address the deterioration
implications of dispersion, they clouded the boundaries of the
nondeterioration policy.

to Clean Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7472(a)). In addition, the 1977
Amendments require procedures prior to redesignation which are more exacting than
those required under the regulations. Compare id. (adding, inter alia, § 164 to Clean
Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. 7474), with 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(3) (1976). These
procedures usually will be important when industry seeks to alter a Class II
designation into a Class III, a change which would permit a larger amount of
emissions to occur.
162. Compare Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (adding § 165 to Clean
Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7475), with 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(d) (1976).
163. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (adding § 166 to Clean Air Act)
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7476).
164. See note 161 supra.
165. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (adding § 165(d)(2)(D)(i) to
Clean Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(2)(D)(i)).
166. See id. (adding § 165(d)(2)(D)(ii) to Clean Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(d)(2)(D)(ii)).
167. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
168. S.REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); see text accompanying note 156
supra.
169. See notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra.
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The stack height provisions of the 1977 Amendments 7 0 should
enable the courts to clarify this problem. Since the new amendments
do not permit tall stacks or other dispersion techniques to be credited
toward emission reductions,' 71 implementation of that provision
should eliminate, finally, deterioration occasioned by dispersion.
6. Federalism
The federalist structure of the United States has hampered
effective enforcement of emission limitations. Any large nation
requires regional and local centers of administration. In a unitarian
state the officials of such outposts are generally appointed by and
directly responsible to the national government. In a federation,
however, the officials of state governments respond primarily to
their individual states and only incidentally to the central administration.
An ambitious scheme like the Clean Air Act can succeed only if
there is an operable mechanism for development and application of
emission restrictions with respect to each pollution source. Although
the federal government could have established local administrative
bodies to perform that function, this would have needlessly
duplicated existing state organizations, and could have created an
undesirable friction between state and federal authority. Thus, the
effort to enforce the 1970 Amendments virtually demanded a joint
federal-state venture. Such a method of implementation, however,
has created serious administrative problems.
State officials, whose allegiance is primarily to their states, are
understandably reluctant to promulgate stringent implementation
plans that will damage the local economy. Some states have refused
to devise politically unpopular plans,17 2 while others have attempted
to use models or test methods which reduce the need for expensive
controls. 7 3 Although EPA possesses the power to substitute its own
provisions when necessary, a decision to do so entails some delay
and more significantly, may result in excessively rapid decisionmaking that is vulnerable to attack in the courts. 174
The federal structure of the United States has also restricted
EPA's power to require the states to adopt measures necessary for
the enforcement of national air quality standards. Although the
170. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 121, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7423).
171. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
172. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). For a
discussion of South Terminal, see notes 56-62, 80-94 and accompanying text supra.
173. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of
NRDC, see text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
174. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
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issue may arise in other contexts as well, in particular, EPA has
suffered several defeats in its attempts to require states to impose
and enforce transportation controls. In the transportation control
cases, 175 EPA had determined that certain state implementation
plans could not achieve national air quality standards because
those plans failed to include methods of controlling and reducing
automobile use. 176 EPA promulgated plans for the affected states
and, because the federal government had no authority to implement
those plans, 177 insisted that the states adopt legislative and
administrative machinery to enforce the federally created controls. 78 Federal sanctions against state governments and officials
were to accompany any failure to adopt such machinery. 179 The
affected states and private parties argued that EPA's action was not
authorized by the statute and, even if authorized, was unconstitutional as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.
Three circuits that have faced the issue of EPA's authority to
compel the states to adopt the machinery necessary to enforce
federally promulgated controls have upheld the states' challenges.' 80
Those courts began with the premise that the constitutional question
should not be reached if resolution of the statutory issue disposed of
the case, and all three held that the 1970 Amendments did not
authorize EPA to require the states to adopt legislation and
175. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977); Alaska v. EPA, 521 F.2d 842 (9th
Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S.
Ct. 1635 (1977); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977). See also Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977);
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
176. It could be argued that EPA's assertion of the inability of a state plan to
achieve national air quality standards was inaccurate in the New York case, Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977). The court there stated that New
York's plan was approved by EPA with certain revisions, but did not indicate what
the revisions were. Id. at 30. The body of the opinion, however, implies that the
transportation controls were developed by the state and New York City rather than by
EPA. Id. at 33-39.
177. For a statement of EPA's position that the 1970 Amendments did not
contemplate direct federal enforcement of state transportation control plans, see 38
Fed. Reg. 30, 632-33 (Nov. 6, 1973).
178. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 254-59 (3d Cir. 1974).
179. 40 C.F.R. § 52.53 (1976); see Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246,
254-56 (3d Cir. 1974).
180. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S.
Ct. 1635 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977); Alaska v. EPA, 521 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1975);
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635
(1977); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct.
1635 (1977). The Ninth Circuit decided three of the five decisions. Both Arizona and
Alaska are brief decisions, relying upon Brown. 521 F.2d at 826; id. at 844.
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administrative tools to enforce federally promulgated state plans. 181
Only the Third Circuit held that Congress intended that EPA direct
state enforcement activity and found such an intent to be constitutional.

82

The merits of the transportation control cases aside, the posture
of their results could have considerably, if not insurmountably,
impaired the effectiveness of the entire 1970 Amendments. Nothing

in the decisions appeared to limit their application to transportation
control plans; thus, recalcitrant states could have, if pressures had
become severe enough, 183 refused to perform any of the administrative and enforcement functions required of them under the 1970
Amendments. Although legally competent to do so, it would be

difficult for the federal government to devise and enforce nationwide
controls. While limiting their holdings to the statutory issue, all
three circuits strongly implied that any statutory attempt to compel

the states to legislate and administer pollution control programs at
1 84
the decree of the federal government would be unconstitutional.
Thus, an argument that Congress could explicitly overrule those

decisions, thereby forcing the constitutional issue, seems useless.
There is, however, little likelihood that the states would stage a
general insurrection against pollution control which would go
unreflected in national legislation. Thus, the result of EPA's defeats
in the transportation control cases might have become a compromise
plan which the states could have, politically speaking, accepted and
enforced. Nevertheless, because pollution control depends on
enforced emission limitations, which in turn depend on effective
local administration, and since there are legal as well as political
181. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S.
Ct. 1635 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977); Alaska v. EPA, 521 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1975); Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977);
Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635
(1977). It should be noted that EPA does have the authority to invoke sanctions
against states that fail to comply with the substantive features of a plan. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-8 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975).
182. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259, 263 (3d Cir. 1974). In Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), the court stated that it need not and would
not reach the question treated in the other cases because the state and city, and not
EPA, had developed the plan. Id. at 39.
183. It is reasonable to believe that state resistance over transportation control is
not accidental. As has been previously noted, the conflict between a clean
environment and a stable economy and lifestyle is particularly acute in this context.
See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra.
184. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977). This case appears to have reached and
decided the constitutional issue, although it held earlier in its opinion that the statute
did not authorize EPA's actions. Id. at 986. See also Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827,
837-42 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977).
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limitations on the extent to which the central government may
mandate state and local action in our federation, a difficult
enforcement problem exists which may hamper achievement of
18 5
national goals.
The 1977 Amendments seem to have responded, albeit to a
limited degree, to the enforcement difficulty presented. Section 111186
commands EPA to institute civil actions for injunctions and
7
penalties in cases of violation by "major stationary source[s]."'1
The 1970 Amendments had permitted, but did not require, such
action.188 The new provision, however, seems a weak response, one
which may not have an impact sufficient to produce adequate
enforcement. The provision is weakened further because the same
section allows a defendant to recover litigation expenses in cases
89
where the court determines that EPA brought suit unreasonably.1
7. Impossibility of Deriving a Health-based Emission Standard
With respect to at least two hazardous air pollutants, i'0 EPA
found it impossible to meet the 1970 Amendments' requirement that
emission standards be based on public health and welfare ramifications. 19 Faced with this impossibility, EPA promulgated regulations
based on available control techniques, 92 an unauthorized retreat to
a technological standard. This phenomenon, which may become
more widespread, illustrates one of the problems engendered by a
pollution control statute that mandates health-based emission
standards: the data necessary to support promulgation of a
particular emission level may be unavailable due to the present level
of medical knowledge. EPA's retreat to a technological base was
probably appropriate, but the need for such an ex post facto
185. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), does not disturb this
conclusion. On the contrary, taken in conjunction with the other cases, Friendsof the
Earth suggests that as long as any state is sufficiently recalcitrant to compel EPA to
draft a plan for that state, a state may escape the requirement that it enforce the plan.
See id. at 38-39; notes 176 & 182 supra.
186. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 111, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §7413).
187. Id. § 111(a) (amending § 113(a)(5) of Clean Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(a)).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
189. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 111(b)(3), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (amending § 113(b) of Clean
Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)).
190. The two hazardous air pollutants are asbestos and vinyl chloride. 2 POLL.
CON. GUIDE (CCH) 3223, citing EPA BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL EMISSION STANDAhDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS - ASBESTOS,
BERULLIUM, AND MERCURY (Air Pollution Technical Data Series, No. APTD-1503,

March 1973) (asbestos); 40 Fed. Reg. 59,531, 59,534 (1975) (vinyl chloride).
3223, citing EPA BACKGROUND
191. See 2 POLL. CON. GUIDE (CCH)
INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS - ASBESTOS, BERULLIUM, AND MERCURY (Air Pollution Technical

Data Series, No. APTD-1503, March 1973); 40 Fed. Reg. 59,531, 59,534 (1975).
192. 40 Fed. Reg. 59,531, 59,534 (1975).
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modification of the statute suggests that Congress legislated without
sufficient knowledge and/or thought about the impossibility of
fulfilling this and possibly other administrative responsibilities
imposed by the 1970 Amendments. Significantly, the 1977 Amendments authorize EPA to order adoption of a specific technology if
EPA concludes that technological or economic considerations
preclude a health-based requirement. 193
C. Summary

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and 1977 were enacted
in large part to accelerate the pace of the implementation of effective
air pollution controls. 194 Yet, indications are that the pace has not
quickened. Difficulties spring from the alleged impossibility of
achieving national ambient air quality standards based upon health
and welfare factors, because of a lack of sophisticated technology
195
and the prohibitive costs of the technology that is available.
Although prior to the 1977 Amendments 196 there was little support in
the Clean Air Act or its legislative history for the view that economic
and technological feasibility factors were to limit the health-based
197
standards, the endorsement of this position in some of the circuits
caused considerable delay in enforcing pollution controls until the
Supreme Court held to the contrary. 98 It may be that the economic
impact of health-based regulations will always find a way, as hydras
grow heads, to inhibit enforcement. If Congress is committed to a
health-based air quality, a tougher declaration of congressional
policy, such as that contained in portions of the 1977 Amendments, 199 might help to destroy industrial, local, and judicial
resistance to its realization. It may be worth asking and discussing,
however, whether the Congress and the country are committed to
such a course, and whether such a course is prudent, given the extent
of economic dislocation which industry asserts would ensue.
Furthermore, pollution control, even if possible to achieve, is
expensive both in terms of dollars and the inevitable restraints on
individual activities, notably automobile use. It is far from apparent
that our society has decided to sacrifice either its standard of living
193. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 110, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (adding § 112(e)(1) & (2) to Clean
Air Act) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1) & (2)).
194. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
195. See notes 123-152 and accompanying text supra.
196. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
197. See notes 124-137 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 147-149 and accompanying text supra.
199. E.g., Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 121, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7423) (stack heights).
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or its luxuries not to mention both, for the sake of its descendants.
Although dissatisfaction with the present air pollution control
program is manifested in several ways - challenges to measurement accuracy," states' refusal to adopt and enforce transportation
controls, 2 1 and contests over permissible control strategies 2 2 - the
root of each manifestation is probably a basic unwillingness to make
the necessary sacrifice.
III.

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

A. Legislation
As with the effort to control air pollution, the federal interest in
water pollution control is nearly thirty years old. 2°3 The first serious
federal involvement, however, occurred under the Water Quality Act
of 1965 (1965 Water Act), 20 4 which required the states to develop
water quality standards and submit them to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (Secretary) for federal approval. 20 5 To fulfill
their statutory obligations, the states had to designate water body
use, develop ambient water quality criteria based upon the particular
06
use, and formulate a plan to implement and enforce the criteria.
The Secretary was authorized to promulgate water quality standards
for uncooperative states, but only after a lengthy procedure not
unlike that involved in the 1967 Air Act. 20 7 Federal enforcement of
federal standards could occur only after notice and with the consent
of the state governor, unless an interstate effect was shown. 20 8
Several years' experience with the use-based statute and minimal
federal involvement created a sense that not only should the federal
role be increased but also that technological feasibility should
replace use as the basis for effluent limitations. 20 9
In response to the perceived shortcomings of the 1965 Water
Act, 2 10 the amendments of 1972 attempted to alter the statutory
200. See notes 80-119 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 175-182 and accompanying text supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
203. See Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948); Zener,
The FederalLaw of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 682,
683 (E. Dolgin ed. 1974).
204. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (amended 1972); see Zener, supra note
203, at 715.
205. Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(c)(1), 79 Stat. 903 (1965); see Zener supra note 203, at
715-19.
206. Pub. L. No. 89-234, §§ 5(c)(1)(A), (B), (c)(2), 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
207. Id. § 5(c)(2), (4); see note 8 supra.
208. Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 6, 79 Stat. 903 (1965); see Zener, supra note 203, at 715.
209. Zener, supra note 203, at 718-19.
210. Id. at 719. For an excellent and thorough description of the 1965 Water Act,
see La Pierre, supra note 11, at 807-12, 826-28.
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scheme of water pollution control. Under the present Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),211 dischargers must meet the
effluent limitations imposed by the original use-based water quality
criteria or those imposed by the newly enacted technology-based
standards, whichever is more stringent. 2 12 The establishment of a
national discharge permit system 213 had made the enforcement of
these effluent limitations more likely.
For the first time under any air or water pollution control
legislation, the federal agency, EPA, is to develop the new effluent
limitations on the basis of plant categories. 2 14 For dischargers other
than publicly owned treatment works, EPA, taking into account a
variety of factors, 215 was to establish limitations for 1977 commensurate with the effluent purity achievable through the use of the "best
practicable control technology currently available."'

216

EPA is to

promulgate effluent purity standards for 1983 equal to that
attainable by use of the "best available technology economically
achievable. ' 21 7 The 1977 standard for publicly owned treatment
facilities in existence on July 1, 1977 or approved for federal
financing at least three years earlier is "secondary treatment." 21 8 By
1983 all publicly owned facilities must reach the level that can be
'219
achieved with the "best practicable water treatment technology.
Standards for new pollution sources are to be based on "best
available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives. '' 2 20 EPA is required to define each of

the statutory terms to be used as a standard in accordance with the
legislative intent. 221 Direct dischargers are prohibited from expelling
any pollutant for which a limitation within their plant category has
been established unless they obtain a permit from EPA, specifying a
precise discharge limit for the particular plant. 222 If they satisfy the
211. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
212. Id. § 1313.
213. Id. §§ 1341-1345.

214. Id.

§ 1311(b). Manufacturing and refining processes are grouped together in

the statute as plant categories on the basis of the process involved. Id. § 1316(b)(1)(A).
Such categories include, inter alia, petroleum refining, leather tanning and finishing,
rubber processing, dairy product processing, and textile mills. Id.
215. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
216. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
217. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
218, Id. § 1311(b)(1)(B).

219. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(B).
220. Id. § 1316(a)(1). The term "new source" is defined in the statute as any source
which is constructed after the effluent standards applicable to such sources have been
promulgated. Id. § 1316(a)(2). A "source" includes "any building, structure, facility, or
installation from which there is or may be the discharge of pollutants." Id.
§ 1316(a)(3).
221. Id. §§ 1311(b), 1314.
222. Id. § 1311(a).
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statutory requirements governing state-administered permit programs, each state is authorized to issue permits,22 3 subject to an EPA
veto power over each permit.224 If this elaborate framework for water
pollution control fails to maintain use-based ambient water quality
standards, the FWPCA provides for the downward adjustment of
225
effluent restrictions to meet those standards.
Thus the hallmarks of the FWPCA, as compared to earlier water
legislation and the Clean Air Act, are 1) centralization in the federal

government of direct control over effluent limitations, 226 and 2)
establishment of effluent limitations based primarily on the
pragmatic

consideration

of what can be done, relegating the

standards that should be achieved to a secondary, albeit important,
position.

22 7

B.

EstablishingEffluent Guidelines

EPA has engaged private consultant firms to study and analyze
the various control technologies that are applicable to each
industry. 228 EPA began the process by preliminarily dividing
industry into categories. 229 The reports of the consultants were then
expected to fully define industrial categories for which separate
effluent limitations needed to be developed. 230 If establishment of the
appropriate effluent limitations required further subdivision of the
categories, the consultants were to establish subcategories on the
basis of such factors as raw materials used, product produced, and
manufacturing process employed. 231 The reports were also to identify
the various technologies available to each subcategory, determine

223. Id. § 1342(b). In order to qualify as a permit issuer a state must submit to EPA
"a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish" and must
demonstrate that it has adequate authority to implement the program. Id. In order to
approve a state permit system EPA must be satisfied that the program provides for
the issuance of permits in compliance with the FWCPA's requirements. Id.
§ 1342(b)(1)-(9).
224. Id. § 1342(a)(5).
225. Id. § 1313.
226. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (4th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
227. See Zener, supra note 203, at 718-19.
228. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Request for Proposals for
Effluent Guidelines Contracts (1973) [hereinafter cited as Request for Proposals]. The
authority to engage private consultants is found in EPA's power to make such rules
and regulations as it deems necessary to perform its functions under the FWPCA. 33
U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. V 1975). See American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d
107, 133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir.
1975).
229. Request for Proposals, supra note 228, pt. II, at 4.
230. Id.
231. Id. In fact, such subcategorization occurred with respect to almost every
category. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 405.10-460.12 (1976).
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which technologies were those identified under the FWCPA for each
subcategory, and propose effluent limitations. 232 Since the purpose of
these reports was to provide the information necessary for EPA to
promulgate regulations, 233 consultants were instructed to supply
234
strong corroborating data to substantiate their conclusions.
This federally controlled, technology-based, method of formulating effluent limitations provides a striking contrast to the system
used to control air pollution. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA is
directed to propose emission control systems to the states, and to
provide them with models to be used in achieving the amount of
emission reduction deemed necessary. 235 However, since a state can
comply with the Clean Air Act by accumulating sufficient reductions
to equal the total required, 23 6 adherence to EPA's models is
unnecessary if the state can devise a satisfactory alternative to
achieve emission reduction. 237 The FWPCA avoids this problem by
centralizing effluent limit decisionmaking in the EPA; thus, a state
does not perform any function that can serve as a mechanism to
challenge EPA's model.238 The accuracy of EPA's models under the

Clean Air Act has been especially vulnerable to challenge because
precise measurement is a diffidult art, which must consider a variety
of factors. 239 The FWPCA's use of technological standards, however,
may suggest a way to avoid the measurement problems encountered
under the Clean Air Act, because the FWPCA eliminates the need for
much of the measurement and prediction of the ambient quality of
the water 240 that has proven so troublesome under the Clean Air
Act. 24 1 The technology-based approach has not, however, eliminated

the enforcement problems created by measurement difficulties.
Persuading courts that certain technologies are practicable or
232. Request for Proposals, supra note 228, pt. II, at 1-2. See La Pierre, supra note
11, at 810-11.
233. Request for Proposals, supra note 228, pt. II, at 2.
234. Id.
235. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970).
237. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840
(1974). For a discussion of this case, see notes 64-72 and accompanying text supra.
238. For a discussion of the centralization of decisionmaking in EPA under
FWPCA, see notes 214-221 and accompanying text supra. In contrast, under the
Clean Air Act, individual states are responsible for developing plans to implement the
federal ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970). The state plans
are subject to industrial challenge on a variety of grounds. See notes 36-42, 124-130
and accompanying text supra.
239. See, e.g., South Terminal Co. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974); Texas v.
EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974).
240. See notes 214-221 and accoinpanying text supra. The FWCPA directs EPA to
establish effluent limitations based upon a technological standard, rather than upon
the quality of the ambient water. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1975).
241. See notes 79-122 and accompanying text supra.
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achievable is fraught with difficulties, and sustaining precise
effluent limitations based upon such technologies has not regularly
met with success. Therefore, it is not possible at this point to draw a
firm conclusion concerning the utility of the technological foundation of the FWPCA.
C. Difficulties In Administration
The FWPCA has given rise to litigation in two significant areas
relating to the creation of effluent quality restrictions and their
application to individual polluters. Questions concerning the nature
and scope of the centralization of authority in EPA to control
effluent quality have been resolved; 242 but administrative difficulties
arising from the technology base of the statute remain.
1. Centralization of Authority to Apply Discharge Limits to Point
Sources
The heart of the FWPCA's attempt to regulate pollution lies in
the requirement that the discharge of any pollutant must be
authorized by permit.243 Recognizing that if the permit system were
not capable of administration, or were subject to subversion, the
framework of the statute would collapse, EPA attempted to avert
those contingencies-by asserting 1) that it had the power to prescribe
exact effluent criteria for classes or categories of effluent source
points, and 2) that the permit issuer 244 must apply the effluent criteria
established for a class of dischargers to each point source within the
class.2

45

The first proposition would permit EPA to create a

sufficiently small number of point source categories to enable it to
devise effluent criteria effectively. EPA's second proposition would
prevent state authorities from routinely granting variances in order
to appease local industry and would avoid the impossible burden
that permit issuers, be they the states or EPA, would inevitably face
if the individual circumstances of every point source had to be
24
considered before restrictions -could be imposed upon its effluent. 6
Acting on these positions, EPA issued regulations that established
specific effluent limits on a category basis, 247 and industry
248
challenged EPA's authority to promulgate these rules.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See notes 243-278 and accorppanying text infra.
"
33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a) (Supp. V 1975).
See text accompanying notes 222-224 supra.
See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 119-20 (1977).
Id. atk26-27.,
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§405.10-460.12 (1976).
See notes 249-253 and accompanying text infra.
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In a series of cases in the lower federal courts, industry claimed
that the scope of EPA's power was limited to publishing guidelines
for the permit issuer, and, further, that only the permit issuer was
authorized to establish the precise restrictions for individual
249
pollution sources, using EPA's regulations as flexible guides.
Industrial groups presented the question 250 to seven of the circuits in
1975 and 1976.251 Those courts resolved the issue in a variety of
ways, 252 before the Supreme Court addressed the conflict in 1977.253
In CPC International,Inc. v. Train (CPC 1)254 the Eighth Circuit
reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of the
FWPCA provisions that mandated the creation and implementation
of effluent restrictions. 255 The court determined that Congress
intended those states electing to establish permit-issuing systems in
conformity with FWPCA's requirements to retain a measure of
256
control over the specific limitations imposed by the permits.
Therefore the court concluded that Congress had not vested in EPA
the authority over the effluent control program which had been
exercised in issuing the regulations. 25 7 The court supported its
conclusion with a narrow construction of the language of section 301
which declares unlawful the discharge of any pollutant in violation
249. See note 251 infra.
250. The substantive issue of EPA's authority to promulgate national effluent
guidelines has been raised as a jurisdictional question on occasion because § 509 of
the FWPCA authorizes review of action taken under § 301 by the local circuit court of
appeals, but not of § 304 action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V 1975); E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1977). See also note 255 infra.
251. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430
U.S. 112 (1977); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.
1976); American Trozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515
F.2d 1032 (8th Cir'. 1975); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975);
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); American Petroleum
Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975).
252. Compare CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975), with American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). See note 271 and
accompanying text infra.
253. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); see notes 274-278
and accompanying text infra.
254. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
255. Id. at 1038-42. The provisions under review are contained in §§ 301, 304, and
402 of the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1342 (Supp. V 1975). Section 402
establishes a system for issuing permits that prescribes the effluent limitations for
individual sources. Id. § 1342; see notes 222-224 and accompanying text supra.
Section 304 authorizes EPA to develop guidelines to be used to determine the degree of
effluent restrictions possible. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V 1975). Section 301 declares the
discharge of any pollutant unlawful unless it is in compliance with the effluent limits
contained in a permit issued pursuant to § 402. Id. § 1311.
256. 515 F.2d at 1042.
257. Id. at 1039-42. The Eighth Circuit appears to be the only circuit to accept
industry's position. See id. at 1037; notes 263-278 and accompanying text infra.
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of the prescribed effluent limits.2 5 8 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit

rejected the contention that this language augmented EPA's power
to issue guidelines for the establishment of effluent limits pursuant
to section 304.259 The court's interpretation of section 301 would have
impeded enforcement of the FWPCA, 260 because its holding seemed
to require the establishment of individualized effluent limitation
determinations for each point source, and EPA review of every stateissued permit, including determination of whether to veto them or
not.2 6 1 In addition, the court's construction allowed judicial review of
each EPA veto. 262 Such a system of administering the FWPCA

would be cumbersome and result in delays which would impede the
congressional objectives underlying the statute.
Although the Third Circuit's analysis in American Iron & Steel
Institute v. EPA26 3 led it to a conclusion different from the Eighth

Circuit's, the decision could have been as troublesome for EPA as the
one rendered in CPCI. The American Iron court concluded that EPA
was empowered under section 301 of the FWPCA to promulgate
effluent limitations, but construed the statutory language narrowly
to restrict the type of limitations that EPA could establish.264 Under
the Third Circuit's construction of the statute, EPA was authorized
only to issue effluent limitation ranges that prescribed the maximum
permissible emissions for each category. 265 Therefore, the court
determined that it was the responsibility of permit issuers rather
than EPA to develop and apply precise single-number limitations
within the guidelines set by EPA for each point source.26 6 As a
result, the Third Circuit remanded the regulations at issue for
reconsideration in light of its holding that EPA was to set the range
of permissible limitations, rather than the specific limitation
26 7

itself.

258. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975); see note 255 supra. See also 515 F.2d at

1038-39.
259. 515 F.2d at 1038-39; see note 255 supra.
260. The Eighth Circuit's conception of the role that the guidelines to be
promulgated pursuant to § 304 were to play is unclear at best. The court indicates that
uniformity of limitations would be achieved and that guidelines must be complied
with. 515 F.2d at 1039. However, what constitutes compliance is not explained. At
most, the court states that Congress resolved the policy issues relating to a § 301
power to promulgate effluent limitations against the granting of such a power. Id. at
1037.
261. See id. at 1039-42.
262. Id. at 1038-39.
263. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
264. Id. at 1036-37, 1042-45.
265. Id. at 1042-45; see notes 214-21 and accompanying text supra. The Third
Circuit's statutory interpretation meant that EPA was not authorized to set effluent
limits for individual pollution sources.
266. 526 F.2d at 1045; accord, American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
267. 526 F.2d at 1066.
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The Third Circuit recognized that the FWPCA vested in EPA the
power to prescribe maximum effluent limitations, but the court's
position diminished the value of a centralized administration in at
least two ways. First, the court's opinion strongly intimates that
maximum limits should allow a higher level of emissions than would
be permitted if the regulations were transposed directly into the
discharge permits. 26 1 Second, by authorizing permit issuers to
establish specific restrictions for each point source, the decision
would necessitate EPA review of every permit, with the possibility
that any veto would culminate in litigation and accompanying
delay. The only difference between the Third Circuit's view and that
of the Eighth Circuit is that, under the former, EPA is assured that
permit emission limitations cannot exceed the maximum prescribed
in the regulations. Thus, both courts resolved against EPA the issues
of whether individual determinations had to be made for each point
source and how restrictive EPA could be in establishing effluent
criteria.
Four circuits have accepted EPA's position that the purpose of

the FWPCA was to centralize the power to set effluent limitations in
order to ensure effective implementation of pollution-control objectives. 269 Two propositions basic to.sucessful administration of the
statute arose from these four decisions. First, the courts sustained
EPA's power to issue national uniform single-number effluent
limitations. 270 Second, although they used a variety of routes to
arrive at their decisions, all four courts held that the statute required
permit issuers to incorporate EPA's effluent limitations into all
discharge permits. 2 71 The courts reached these results as a consequence of their interpretations of the legislative history and purposes
of the FWPCA, and in at least one case, a realization that limiting

268. See id. at 1045.
269. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v..Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4t Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430
U.S. 112 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1623 (10th Cir. 1976);
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d 9ir. 1976); American
Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
270. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1029 (4th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1031 (10th
Cir. 1976); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 630 (2d Cir.
1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 448-52 (7th Cir. 1975). See notes
265-266 and accompanying text supra.
271. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1028 (4th Cir. 1976)
aff'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1031 (10th
Cir. 1976); Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 630 (2d Cir.
1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 1975). For a slightly
different interpretation of these cases, see E.I.,duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 125 n.15 (1977).
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EPA's authority would substantially undermine its ability to enforce
272
the statute.
The litigation concerning EPA's role under the FWPCA had
created confusion concerning its authority to promulgate and, more
importantly, enforce precise effluent limitations. Since EPA's ability
to administer the statute effectively depended on the manageability
of EPA's role,2 73 no national water pollution control effort could be
fully mobilized until the Supreme Court resolved the conflict among
the circuits over the interpretation of the FWPCA.
In E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 274 the Supreme Court
sustained EPA's interpretation of the FWPCA. Initially, the Court
outlined the statutory provisions 275 and then properly observed that
the issue was whether the statute authorized EPA to establish
effluent limitations for categories of dischargers, which permit
issuers were then required to place in the permits issued for
individual sources within the category. 276 The Court analyzed the
language and legislative history of the statute, and then concluded
that EPA possessed the authority it asserted. 277 In reaching its
conclusions, the Court added this crucial observation:
The petitioner's view of the Act [FWPCA] would place an
impossible burden on EPA. It would require EPA to give
individual consideration to the circumstances of more than
42,000 dischargers who have applied for permits . . ., and to
issue or approve all these permits well in advance of the 1977
deadline in order to give industry time to install the necessary
pollution control equipment. We do not believe that Congress
would have failed so conspicuously to provide EPA with the
278
authority, needed to achieve the statutory goals.
The issue, therefore, appears to have been resolved in a manner
that will facilitate the administration of a water pollution control
program. Nevertheless, inferior drafting and incomplete legislative
history caused considerable delay in implementing the statute by

272. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018,1027 (4th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). The District of Columbia Circuit also recognized the

importance of centralized authority in American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d
107, 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1976), but does not seem to have followed the concept through.
273. See text accompanying notes 243-246 & 272 supra.
274. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
275. Id. at 116-21.
276. Id. at 1-24. EPA's position that'the effluent limitations it promulgated were to
be incorporated directly into the permits issued for individual sources did provide for a
minor variance procedure. See id.
277. Id. at 136.
278. Id. at 132-33 (citations omitted).
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fostering a statutory interpretation issue which could have been
easily averted.
2. Review of Effluent Limitations
As under the air pollution control legislation, 279 judicial review
of EPA's attempts to specify effluent limitations has often prevented
enforcement of those restrictions. The FWPCA cases illustrate the
two types of administrative actions that have been the focus of
industry challenge: 1) the selection of a specific technological process
or method for a given category to satisfy the statutory requirements;
and 2) determinations of the specific effluent quality that can be
attained once the proper technology is agreed upon.
In a group of early cases, EPA encountered a series of setbacks
with little accompanying success. 5 0 Although EPA has continued to
suffer judicial reprimand in more recent decisions, it has been more
successful than in the previous cases. 28' In addition, examination of
the cases indicates that some circuits have been more inclined than
others to sustain the propriety of EPA's determinations. 2 2 The
emergence of this judicial pattern legitimately causes one to ask
whether the difficulties encountered in transforming the FWPCA
standards into specific effluent limitations for individual dischargers stem from the statute, EPA's performance, individual
judges' perceptions of the proper scope of review, socioeconomic
considerations that may vary among circuits, or the societal impact,
as perceived by the courts, of the imposition of controls on a
particular industry.
a) Judicial Resistance
The Eighth Circuit's disposition of the jurisdictional issue in
CPC I,283 the first major case brought under the FWPCA, left that

court with only the EPA promulgated new source standards 284 to
review on the merits. 285 EPA had fixed effluent standards for three
pollutants discharged by plants in the corn wet milling industry. 286
279. See text accompanying notes 54-78 supra.
280. See text accompanying notes 283-293 & 307-327 infra.
281. See text accompanying notes 328-373 infra.
282. See text accompanying notes 328-337 & 339-351 infra.
283. For a prior discussion of CPC I, see notes 254-262 and accompanying text
supra. See also note 250 supra.
284. See note 220 and accompanying text supra.
285. 515 F.2d at 1043.
286. Id. at 1034. EPA regulations describe the activity in the corn wet milling
industry as a "process in which shelled corn is steeped in a dilute solution of sulfurous
acid and then processed by wet means into such products as animal feed, regular and
modified starches, corn oil, corn syrup, and dextrose." 40 C.F.R. §406.10 (1976).
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Industry claimed that the technology required to achieve the EPA
standards did not coincide with the technology articulated under the
287
statute for new sources.
The court explained that EPA had arrived at the new source
standards by supplementing the technological processes available to
implement the 1977 limitations, and by calculating the improvement
in effluent

quality that would result. 288

Therefore, the court

concluded that the validity of the new source standards depended
upon the validity of four premises: 1) that the technological methods
selected for the 1977 effluent standards were within that contemplated by the statute; 2) that these processes would perform as
predicted; 3) that the supplemental technological process was within
that contemplated by the statute for new sources; and 4) that the
added method would perform as predicted. 28 9 Thus, the two types of
challenges to the FWPCA suggested earlier - to the consistency of
the chosen technology with the statute and to the achievable
performance level of a given technology - were ripe in CPC I.
Industry conceded that the 1977 technological methods were
within the parameters of the statute, but challenged the performance
ability of that technology. 29° Although the Eighth Circuit rejected
industry's challenge, 291 it refused to endorse EPA's position that
additional technology could be applied to. the corn wet milling
industry. 292 The court noted EPA's conclusory, unsupported statements in the record to the effect that the supplemental technological
process could be used in the industry as evidence that EPA had
failed to demonstrate that the new source standards had been
293
reasonably set.

The court's conclusion in CPC I that the record EPA presented
did not offer substantial support for the new source standards was
justified; but new source standards will be for naught if they do not
motivate industry to invest capital in the development of technologies capable of providing a better effluent quality. The Eighth
Circuit did not consider this purpose, much less balance it against

287. 515 F.2d at 1045; see text accompanying note 220 supra.
288. 515 F.2d at 1045.
289. Id. at 1046.

290. Id.
291. Id. It must be recalled that the court's approval of EPA's action was in the
context of a step-by-step analysis of the validity of the new source regulations, not the
1977 regulations. For the different standards applicable to each effluent limit, see text
accompanying notes 216 & 220 supra.
292. 515 F.2d at 1047.
293. Id. at 1048-50. In addition, the court declared that EPA had not sufficiently
considered the costs to individual sources of implementing the new source standards
in developing these standards. Id. at 1050-51.
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the incompleteness of the administrative record. It is difficult to
understand how EPA is to translate the statute's technology-based
standards into precise and stringent effluent limits without such an
approach.
In American Meat Institute v. EPA,294 the petitioners challenged
several of EPA's 1977 and 1983 standards for the meat packing
industry. 295 After deciding that EPA had the power to issue
nationally applicable effluent criteria, 296 the Seventh Circuit
examined EPA's choice of technologies and the effluent limits EPA
derived from them. 297 Although industry seemed to concede that the
1977 technologies were consistent with FWPCA requirements, 298 the
petitioners asserted that those processes would be unable to achieve
the effluent quality that EPA prescribed.2 99 The court considered
industry's challenges based upon the effect of seasonal changes on
the performance of the technological processes involved and upon
industry's claim that the record did not demonstrate that the
identified technology could reduce the effluent to the required
level." After a detailed review of the data, the court sustained all
but one of EPA's effluent limitations. 3°1
In addition, industry contended that the 1983 technology was
not within the statutory framework. 3 2 The court reviewed the record
prepared by EPA and concluded that a sufficient number of
antipollution devices had been suggested by EPA to refute the
industry's complaint that the required effluent criteria were
unattainable. 303 Thus, the court sustained both EPA's choice of
technologies and the effluent limits derived. Curiously, despite
industry's position "that EPA's standards . . . are unattainable by
the 1983 technology designated by EPA. .... "301 the court did not

discuss whether the technologies selected and upheld could in fact
30 5
achieve the effluent performance mandated.
294. 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
295. Id. at 444. The standards under review limited the quantities of various
pollutants that were discharged by meat packing plants during the production
process. Id.
296. Id. at 448-52; see notes 269-271 and accompanying text supra.
297. 526 F.2d at 453-66.
298. Id.at 454.
299. Id.at 454-62.
300. Id. at 454-56.
301. Id. at 466.
302, Id. at 463-64.
303. Id. at 464.
304. Id.at 463.
305. See id. at 462-64. The Seventh Circuit appeared to have been satisfied that
EPA had suggested several sources of limitations and merely assumed that they
would perform as required. Id. at 464. In contrast, the court did hold that EPA had
failed to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed technology for the implementation of the 1983 ammonia standards. Id. at 464-66.
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It is difficult to determine from the opinions alone in CPC I and
American Meat whether the two circuits assumed different roles as
reviewers of EPA's regulations. 30 6 The Eighth Circuit in CPC I
quoted conclusory statements of EPA that were probably insufficient
to withstand attack, while the Seventh Circuit relied upon more
specific data. Regardless of the specificity of the record that EPA
presents to the courts, however, the results still may be left to
judicial discretion, because the complexity of the esoteric technological data that must be reviewed allows courts to construe the facts in
accordance with individual judges' preconceptions as to the desired
results. The present statutory scheme, therefore, can be implemented
only through the sufferance of the courts.
Examination of other litigation tends to strengthen this
hypothesis. On March 10, 1976, a panel of the Fourth Circuit
disposed of a number of petitions for review of EPA discharge
regulations. In E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,30 7 the court
considered challenges brought by several companies producing
inorganic chemicals, and in Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v.
Train,308 review of limitations established for the leather tanning
and finishing industry was sought. In both cases, the court was not
convinced that EPA had proven that the technologies it had selected
were within the statutory meaning, and vacated and remanded
nearly all of the challenged regulations. 309
In Tanners' Council, EPA had determined that the existing
waste treatment technology throughout the leather industry was
thoroughly inadequate and had decided to adopt technology from
the meat packing industry. 310 The court upheld EPA's authority to
transfer technologies, but set aside the 1977 effluent limitations on
the ground that the record offered no evidence to support the effluent
limitations that had been transferred from the meat packing
industry to the leather tanners. 31' Since EPA had derived new source
standards from the 1977 limitations, the court vacated them as
well. 312 Although the court did not remand the 1983 effluent
306. It can be questioned whether it is coincidental that the Eighth Circuit in CPC
I denied EPA the power to set administrable effluent limits in addition to remanding
the new source standards, while the Seventh Circuit in American Meat recognized the
grant of the general power to establish effluent limits as well as sustained most of the
specific regulations that were challenged. Compare 515 F.2d at 1045-46, with 526 F.2d
at 464.
307. 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). For a prior discussion
of the Supreme Court's treatment of this case, see text accompanying notes 274-278
supra.
308. 540 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976).
309. 541 F.2d at 1039; 540 F.2d at 1196.
310. 540 F.2d at 1192.
311. Id. at 1192-94.
312. Id. at 1194.
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standards, they were sustained only after lengthy comments
indicating that EPA had not, in fact, adequately demonstrated the
appropriateness of the selected technology and that EPA would be
required to do so in the future. 31 3 The court further suggested that it
sustained the regulations only because there was no substantial
ground not to do so, since further review of those regulations would
3 14
be available as their effective date approached.
If the Tanners' Council decision was a setback for EPA, duPont
appears to have been a disaster. The circuit court in duPont
reviewed eleven specific types of pollutants, vacating and remanding
nearly all the regulations. 3 15 Although varying reasons formed the
foundation for the court's actions in duPont, the overall tone of the
court's opinion revealed great annoyance, perhaps anger, with
EPA's regulatory processes. In several instances the court found
3 16
insufficient support for the technologies selected by EPA.
Additional regulations were set aside because EPA failed to justify
its derivation of effluent limits. 317 The court remanded other
regulations, stating that the record was too confused to provide a
basis for judicial review. 318 Viewed more broadly, however, the tone
and tenor of the opinion suggest that the court simply was
exasperated with what it perceived as EPA's ad hoc, slipshod and
3 19
insensitive attitude and procedures.
As was true with CPC P2O and American Meat,3 21 one cannot be
sure that the Tanners' Council and duPont decisions reveal a
particular judicial attitude toward EPA's attempts to enforce an
important and administratively burdensome national policy. Nevertheless, however seriously EPA may have neglected to prepare and
present adequate support for its regulations, the Fourth Circuit's
language suggests neither sympathy nor understanding for the
difficult task that the FWPCA imposed upon EPA.

313. Id. at 1196.
314. Id. at 1195-96.
315. 541 F.2d at 1039.

316. Id. at 1034-35.
317. Id. at 1034, 1036-37.
318. Id. at 1033-34, 1036-38. It should be noted that with regard to some of the
regulations, even EPA conceded that a remand was necessary. Id. at 1035.

319. The court's attitude is revealed in its following remarks:
The strained effort in the EPA brief to justify agency action leaves us in a state
of extreme confusion. We have examined every record reference made by EPA.
They are cryptic, mystic, and enigmatic. If there is to be any worthwhile judicial
review of agency action, the action must be presented and supported in a manner
capable of judicial understanding.
Id. at 1037.
320. See notes 283-293 and accompanying text supra.
321. See notes 294-305 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 6 [1977], Art. 2

1976-1977]

AIR

AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

1163

The same Fourth Circuit panel that decided Tanners' Council
and duPont displayed a similar attitude toward EPA's regulations of
heat discharges from steam electric generating plants in Appalachian Power v. Train.322 The steam electric generating industry
produces excess heat which must be eliminated.3 23 Since the thermal
pollution accompanying discharges of heat into waters that contain
aquatic life may destroy the ecological balance there, EPA's
regulations sanctioned only the use of methods of heat release that
did not damage the waters. 324 Industry challenged these regulations
on several grounds.
The court reaffirmed EPA's power to establish nationally
uniform standards, but simultaneously emasculated that power in
holding EPA's requirements for obtaining a variance from compliance with the 1977 standards to be excessively rigid, vacating the
325
variance clause, and ordering EPA to devise a more flexible one.

The effect of this decision may be to frustrate the statutory purpose
of centralized effluent control because the less stringent a variance
provision is, the greater is the discretion vested in the permit
326
issuer.
Numerous portions of the AppalachianPower opinion illustrate
the court's apparent displeasure with EPA's performance.3 27 Once
again the language, tone, and disposition of the case suggest that
the Fourth Circuit paid little deference to EPA's decisions. Although
the court's finding that the administrative record was woefully
inadequate may have been justified, an analysis of these early cases
readily leads to the conclusion that, when reviewing challenged EPA

322. 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir.), modified, 545 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1976).
323. 545 F.2d at 1355.
324. Id. at 1357.
325. Id. at 1359.
326. Industry's challenges to EPA's specific effluent levels were also generally
upheld. One challenged requirement was the use of thermal backfit devices, which
prevent large quantities of heat from escaping into the waters. Id. at 1361. The court
invalidated EPA's thermal backfit requirements on the ground that the record failed
to show any relationship between the cost of heat discharge reduction to the extent
required and the benefit to the aquatic environment and to demonstrate sufficiently
that this requirement was economically achievable. Id. at 1363-66.
The court also reviewed EPA's restriction on the use of a "cooling lake",
defined as a "manmade water impoundment which impedes the flow of a navigable
stream and which is used to remove waste heat from ... water prior to recirculating
the water . . .," 40 C.F.R. §423.11(n) (1976), to achieve effluent limits through the
utilization of the best available technology. 545 F.2d at 1367-71. In overturning EPA's
restriction on the use of cooling lakes, the court noted that no consideration of the
effect of that technology on water supplies in several arid sections of the country
appeared in the record. Id. at 1369-71. Some of the court's language on this point
implies impatience with EPA and is reminiscent of the Fourth Circuit's annoyance in
duPont. Id. at 1370-71; see note 319 supra.
327. See, e.g., 545 F.2d at 1371-77.
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regulations, the courts tended to overlook the congressional objective
of improving the quality of water.
b)

The Pro-EPA Trend

EPA has experienced more favorable judicial treatment in four
recent decisions concerning its prescribed effluent limitations. In
American Paper Institute v. Train325 several manufacturers of paper
products challenged EPA's regulations on a number of familiar
grounds. The District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the industry's
contentions that EPA had not properly considered the cost of
implementing the regulations. 329 The court explained that the record
presented by EPA contained a detailed analysis of the costs involved
and that EPA's conclusion that industry could readily bear those
costs was reasonable. 330 The contrast between this court's discussion
of the cost issue and the Fourth Circuit's discussion of the same
issue in AppalachianPower is striking. 331 The American Papercourt
did not stress that EPA had failed to assess the expected
environmental benefit in relation to its cost; indeed, it scarcely
alluded to this point. 332 The dissimilarities in the two industries may
explain and justify the results reached by the courts; 33 3 however, the
possible existence of different judicial premises may provide a
sounder explanation for the wholly different emphases in the courts'
opinions.
The same deferential attitude pervaded the American Paper
334
court's consideration of the validity of specific effluent limitations.
The District of Columbia Circuit upheld EPA's 1977 effluent
limitation guidelines for the industry's pollutants after only a brief
review of the challenges. 335 In addition, the court determined that
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
noted:

543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Id. at 339.
Id.
545 F.2d at 1363-65; see note 326 supra.
See 543 F.2d at 338-39. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Appalachian Power

Industry challenges EPA's reliance upon those [cost] figures on the ground
that they do not indicate whether the regulations will result in reasonable further
progress toward the national goal. We agree. EPA's study merely establishes...
cost-effectiveness .

. .

. It in no way indicates whether, in light of the associated

costs, application of such systems will result in reasonable effluent reduction
levels.
545 F.2d at 1363.
333. The process of paper, pulp, and paperboard production, by which chemical
pollutants are released into waterways, was involved in American Paper.543 F.2d at
332. However, in Appalachian Power the concern was the operation of steam electric
generating plants that caused the discharge of heat into the waters. 545 F.2d at 1355.
334. 543 F.2d at 345.
335. Id. at 340-46.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 6 [1977], Art. 2

1976-1977]

AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

1165

there was a sound basis in the record presented by EPA to support
the 1983 effluent limitation standards. 336 In disposing of these
issues, the court focused on the fulfillment of the purpose of the
FWPCA - "the complete elimination of pollution discharges to the
Nation's waters by 1985." 337 Thus, a court, emphasizing the broad
purpose of the statute rather than scrutinizing the administrative
record for inconsistencies and ambiguities, probably will engage in a
type of judicial review that will be more deferential to EPA's actions
3 38
than previously examined FWPCA cases have been.
Three cases subsequent to American Paper have apparently
embraced its type of review. In American Petroleum Institute v.
Train339 the Tenth Circuit reviewed EPA regulations challenged by
the petroleum refining industry. The court, in contrast to the Fourth
Circuit cases, rejected industry's general attack on EPA's 1977
variance clause. 340 The Tenth Circuit concluded that it would be
inappropriate to reject the variance provision on its face and that the
courts should await a specific complaint about EPA's application of
the clause. 341 Such a judicial response not only preserves EPA's
independent authority, but also facilitates implementation of the
FWPCA. Rather than being compelled to draft a variance provision
perhaps several times, in response to judicial reviews of the clause
on its face, and then responding to inevitable challenges over
specific applications of the approved provision, EPA's variance
regulations will be subject to judicial review only at the latter stage.
The petroleum institute also challenged EPA's limitations for
1977, 1983, and new sources. The court endorsed EPA's requirement
for 1977 in-plant modifications, both in principle, as had all other
circuits, 342 and specifically as applied to the petitioners. 343 Moreover,
even where the court perceived an error in EPA's effluent limitations, it avoided a remand. For example, industry asserted that
EPA's requirements were gross, as opposed to net, limitations. 344 A
336. Id. at 346-54.
337. Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
338. See notes 283-327 and accompanying text supra.
339. 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976).
340. Id. at 1032-33. Judge Breitenstein, the author of the American Petroleum
opinion, had dissented from the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the variance clause at
issue in Appalachian Power while sitting on the Fourth Circuit by designation. 545
F.2d at 1379-80 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting); see notes 307-327 and accompanying
text supra.
341. 540 F.2d at 1033.
342. See id. at 1033-34.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1034-35. The court defined the scope of these types of limitations as
follows: "Net limitations apply only to the excess of pollutants discharged over the
pollutants, if any, in the intake water. Gross limitations apply to the total amount of
pollutants discharged regardless of pollutants in the intake water." Id. at 1034.
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gross limitation meant that a particular point source would have to
cleanse water taken in, not merely refrain from additional pollution. 345 The court agreed with industry's position that a permit
holder could not be charged with the responsibility to clean intake
water if the source's facilities for processing waste water were not
designed to do both jobs. 346 The court nevertheless sustained EPA's
use of gross limitations, 347 ruling that a particular permit holder
could obtain appropriate relief by seeking a permit adjustment in a
348
specific proceeding for that purpose.
Although the Tenth Circuit rejected some of EPA's positions, it
recognized the extraordinary administrative difficulties encountered
by EPA in attempting to implement the FWPCA. 34 9 Such an
approach seems substantively different from the attitude displayed
35
in earlier decisions 35° and is closer to the American Paper tone. '
In CPC International, Inc. v. Train (CPC I/),352 the Eighth
Circuit again reviewed standards for new plants in the corn wet
milling industry on petitions for review of EPA's action on remand
from CPC I.3 3 On remand, EPA was directed to establish new
354
standards or furnish support for those that had been remanded.
EPA chose to resubmit the same standards after administrative
proceedings were held, and industry then challenged the standards
once again. 355 At the outset, the court cautiously approved EPA's
general proceedings upon remand. 3 6 It therefore refused to vacate
the regulations in their entirety, as it had in CPC I, and then
proceeded to conduct a more detailed and specific review of
particular standards for new plants and of industry's claim that
7
EPA had given improper consideration to the costs of compliance. 35
The Eighth Circuit sustained one of the two challenged
standards. 358 In CPC I the court had noted that EPA's performance
345. See id. at 1034.
346. Id. at 1034-35.
347. Id. at 1035.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1038. Despite the court's awareness of the administrative obstacles EPA
had encountered under the FWPCA, it was compelled to set aside the 1983 regulations
because the technology on which they were based was not shown to be available. Id.
350. See notes 283-327 and accompanying text supra.
351. See notes 328-332 and accompanying text supra.
352. 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976).
353. Id. at 1331; see 515 F.2d at 1050-51. See also text accompanying notes 283-293
supra.
354. 515 F.2d at 1050.
355. 540 F.2d at 1332.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1334-44.
358. Id. at 1338. The court upheld EPA's new source standard for BOD,, a
pollutant measurement of a five-day biochemical oxygen demand, on the grounds that
EPA had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in setting the standard. Id. at 1334 n.5,

1338. However, the court concluded that the new source standard for TSS, a pollutant
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projections for a particular plant were unsubstantiated. 359 In
response, apparently during the interval between CPC I and the
administrative proceedings on remand, EPA assembled considerable
data regarding the plant; therefore, EPA's record in CPC II provided
detailed information of the plant's actual performance. The court's
analysis of that information produced the conclusion that EPA had
demonstrated that its standards could be met. 360 A similar examination of the other challenged EPA limitation 36 1 however, led the court
to a contrary conclusion. According to the court, the evidence
showed that the pollutant readings taken at several corn wet milling
plants did not support the standard EPA had set.3 6 2 Moreover, it was
unpersuaded by evidence of pollutant readings from other industries
which EPA introduced to justify its action with respect to the corn
wet milling industry. 36 3 Rather than remand, however, the court
stated that time pressures compelled it to approve a less stringent
limit.364 Thus, even though the court could not uphold EPA's
regulations, its action eliminated a potentially endless series of
administrative actions and judicial remands.
Finally, the court sustained EPA's analysis of the costs of
implementing the standards. 36 5 The court initially stated that a costbenefit analysis did not have to be undertaken but that a
determination affirming industry's ability to reasonably bear the
costs would be sufficient. 366 The Eighth Circuit then upheld EPA's
projection of the additional CoSts, 367 rejecting as unsupported and
conclusory the figures that industry offered. The court believed that
EPA's consideration of two other cost issues was inadequate but
again did not order a remand. Rather, the court said: "Based on a
careful review of a generally unsatisfactory record, we reluctantly
conclude that the EPA has not abused its discretion ... "368
Despite the court's dissatisfaction with some of EPA's actions on
remand, it upheld EPA's position on all but one issue. 369 There is a
measurement of the total amount of inorganic and organic solids suspended in
wastewaters, could not pass the arbitrary and capricious level of review. Id. at 1338
n.9, 1340.
359. 515 F.2d at 1049.
360. 540 F.2d at 1335.
361. The other new source standard that was under review was TSS. Id. at
1338-40; see note 358 supra.
362. 540 F.2d at 1338-39.
363. Id. at 1339.
364. Id. at 1340.
365. Id. at 1344.
366. Id. at 1341-42.
367. Id. at 1343.
368. Id. at 1344.
369. It is especially noteworthy that, with respect to the new source standards for
TSS, the court actively assisted EPA to avoid ordinarily applicable remand
proceedings. See notes 361-364 and accompanying text supra.
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substantial likelihood that the record EPA presented to the court in
CPC II was superior to the one offered in CPC I. Nevertheless, the
court's attitude toward EPA, its responsibilities, and the congressional objective underlying the FWPCA seems more deferential than
the tone of the opinion in CPC I.
The Eighth Circuit displayed a similar attitude in National
Renderers' Association v. EPA. 370 In that case, the rendering
industry challenged EPA's new source regulations on the ground
that the cost of the technology that would be required to implement
the standards was unreasonable, and hence the standards were
inconsistent with the statute. 37 ' Although the court agreed with the
industry that the record did not verify the reasonableness of the
additional costs and remanded the matter to EPA for further
proceedings, it attempted to facilitate EPA's task on remand by
explaining the specific errors that EPA had made in its methods of
calculation. 372 The court's language does not contain the animosity
3 73
that seems to have pervaded the earlier decisions.
The cases reflecting this more favorable judicial attitude toward
EPA374 were based on a premise of EPA's role that differed markedly
from the one that other courts had accepted 375 only a few weeks
earlier. 376 Unexpectedly, the courts suddenly found EPA's actions to
be thorough and reasonable 377 rather than arbitrary and capricious. 3 78 Regardless of the propriety of either approach, this
transformation highlights that dissimilar judicial premises probably
3 79
result in different levels of judicial review.
c) Summary
A number of points emerge from this review of the decisions
concerning EPA's performance in promulgating water effluent
controls. One explanation for the pattern of decisions would posit
that there has been a significant improvement in EPA's administration of the FWPCA. 380 Exploration of this theory would, however,

370. 541 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1976).
371. Id. at 1286. The court described the rendering industrial process as the
conversion of "inedible animal raw materials into salable by-products for commercial
use." Id. at 1284.
372. Id. at 1286-89.
373. See text accompanying notes 283-327 supra.
374. See notes 328-373 and accompanying text supra.
375. See notes 283-327 and accompanying text supra.
376. For a list of the decision dates, see note 385 infra.
377. See notes 330, 336, 360 & 366 and accompanying text supra.
378. See notes 293, 311, 316-318 & 327 and accompanying text supra.
379. See text following note 333 supra.
380. See text accompanying notes 328-373 supra.
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entail a thorough examination of the administrative records and is
beyond the scope of this article. It may also be possible that the
courts became more reluctant to order wholesale remands as
statutory deadlines began to approach and pass. 38 '
The cases also suggest that the results may depend upon which
circuit is reviewing EPA's actions. It will be noted that the Fourth
Circuit has been particularly hostile to EPA, 382 while the Tenth and
District of Columbia Circuits have been more deferential, 383 and the
384
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have stood somewhere in between.
However, this hypothesis cannot be properly tested at this point,
because the Fourth Circuit did not render a decision after the Eighth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuit cases were decided. 38 5 The
time gap, however, was minimal, and hence this theory may be
credible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the explanation for the courts' differing decisions may
be, it is by no means clear that a technology-based statute is
significantly easier to translate successfully into direct control of
pollutant discharges than is a health-based statute. Although the
health-based statute forces courts squarely to confront the issue of
whether to uphold EPA action that would force the termination of
some enterprises, the technology-based statute requires the same
decision disguised as questions of whether a given technology or
effluent standard is economically feasible. The FWPCA cases
reinforce the conclusion that, the congressional objective notwithstanding, the country simply may not be prepared to make the
necessary sacrifices to achieve an acceptable environment. 386 If that
is the explanation for judicial reluctance to support EPA under both
the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA, the particular statutory basis health or technology - may not be important.
On the other hand, if Congress is seriously determined to
achieve an effective pollution control system, there are several ways
in which it could facilitate EPA's attempt to realize that goal. First,
381. See, e.g., National Renderers' Ass'n. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1292 (8th Cir.
1976); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1329, 1340 (8th Cir. 1976).
382. See text accompanying notes 307-327 supra.
383. See text accompanying notes 328-351 supra.
384. See text accompanying notes 283-305, 352-373 supra.
385. The last Fourth Circuit decision was entered on July 16, 1976. Appalachian
Power v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976). Cf. National Renderers' Ass'n. v. EPA,
541 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1976) (August 30); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th
Cir. 1976) (August 18); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir.
1976) (August 11); American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(August 6).
386. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra. See also note 183 supra.
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improved drafting would reduce the likelihood of extensive litigation.3 8 7 A centralization of the power to enforce the Clean Air Act,
such as was finally achieved through litigation under the
FWPCA, 385 would promote control of air pollution. 389 Further, a
narrower scope of judicial review of EPA action might help to
insulate EPA's regulations from repeated attack. Courts, however,
often find ways to do as they please even under narrow standards of
review, 39° and one may legitimately hesitate before granting the
EPA too loose a rein. 391 In addition, tying federal programs, like
the funding of highways, to compliance with related pollution
control measures such as transportation control plans, would
alleviate some of EPA's enforcement problems and would insulate
state and local officials from local political pressure to impede
compliance. Finally, a larger administrative staff probably would
enable EPA to produce more detailed and satisfactory administrative records for the courts to examine.
387. See text following note 278 supra.
388. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
389. It does not appear that Congress has followed this course in the 1977
Amendments.
390. See, e.g., Bracey v. Rundle, 494 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'g 356 F. Supp. 673
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
391. Section 305 of the 1977 Amendments alters the scope of judicial review in form
only. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, §305, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607). The Conference Report statement that Congress intends the courts to continue
the "thorough, comprehensive review which has characterized judicial proceedings
under the Clean Air Act thus far," H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977),
evidences that this change is cosmetic only.
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